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The authors provide a methodology for implementing IRM
in Naval shore activities. The research stemmed from the
authors* perception that hardware procurement was oversha-
dowing the determination of. actual information system
requirements. The framework presented approaches an
Information Resource Management implementation from the
perspective of the activity's commanding officer. The
emphasis is on the information needs of the commanding
officer and the criticality of identifying the information
requirements prior tc automating an information system for
the activity. The evolution of Information Resource
Management is discussed and precedes a presentation of an
IRM infrastructure for the shore activity. The authors
include a case for an IRM professional within the Navy. The
thesis concludes with a detailed checklist to aid the
commanding officer in the thought processes required to
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Data is recognized as a valuable organizational
resource, one that should be managed like other resources of
the activity, such as personnel, money, and supplies.
According to John Diebold, the originator of the term
Information Resource Management:
It is clear that organizations which will excel in the
1980*3 will be those that recognize information as a
major resource and structure it as efficiently as they
do ether assets. [Ref. 1: p. 51]
Providing accurate, relevant, and timely information entails
a significant cost for the organization and presents a
substantial challenge to the commanding officer of a Naval
shore activity. Unfortunately, a precise, workable method-
ology for implementing an information system for an activity
seems unavailable. In addition, qualified personnel are not
normally available to implement IRM at the organizational
level.
This thesis provides a methodology for implementation of
Information Resource Management (IRM) at Naval shore activi-
ties. The research stemmed from the authors' perception
that hardware procurement is overshadowing the determination
of actual information system requirements. It is relieved
by the authors that many activities are procuring automated
equipment without any thought as to how the equipment will
be used.
A comparison of the history of information systems in
both the private sector and the Federal Government is
presented. The consensus of the authors of this thesis is
that both the private sector and government organizations
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have much the same problems in controlling hardware prolif-
eration, system implementation, and software engineering
techniques. The military seems to lag somewhat in taking
advantage of technological advances of recent years. The
authors would submit that bureaucratic red-tape, stemming
from numerous procurement regulations, has been a major
factor for this phenomenon. However, the authors contend
that the commanding officer can learn much from the chief
executive officer in the civilian world on such issues as:
1
.
Procurement regulations and procedures.
2. The computer being perceived as the answer to any and
all problems.
3. Increasing individual worker productivity as labor
and personnel costs continue to rise.
4. Curtailing the regulations directed at large scale
applications to fit the shore activity's needs and
requirements.
5. The importance of top management involvement and
total commitment to any information system
inplementation.
Throughout, the authors try to emphasize the criticality
of the organization identifying the information requirements
and flews pri or to attempting any automation at the
activity. Unless the commanding officer can fully specify
the mission and objectives of the organization both in the
near and long term, and convey those information require-
ments needed to accomplish those stated goals to the organi-
zation, any_ implementation strategy attempted by the
activity is in jeopardy.
A systematic approach for the initial steps of an infor-
mation system implementation through the automation stages
is required by the commanding officer. The authors have
provided such a strategy. Additionally, a detailed
11

checklist summarizes the approach presented. The checklist
is presented in a "bullet" format that asks specific and
crucial questions of the commanding officer and the organi-
zational department reads. The checklists could be repro-
duced and used as an aid in the formalization of the thought
processes required to implement IRM at a Naval shore
activity.
A discussion of the evolution of Information Resource
Management procedes the authors 1 attempt to define IRM for
the shore activity, utilizing the recently briefed (July
1984) Bases and Stations Architecture. The authors conclude
by making a case for an I5H professional within the Navy
officer corps; a view recently recommended by a council
requested to review the Navy's Nontactical AD? programs, and
formulate ways that the Navy might improve its program (s).
[Ref. 2: pp. 1-19].
The implementation formalized by the authors consists of
6 steps:
1. Command Support Development. The commanding officer
develops a command wide interest and understanding of
Information Resource Management utilizing lectures,
handouts, and Plan of the Day notes. Additionally,
department heads, as key top management personnel,
are motivated to support the implementation process.
2- Strategic Requirements Development. The commanding
officer in consort with the department heads and
users of the system, establish and define the stra-
tegic direction and objectives of the activity. The
critcal success factors (CSF's) are identified that
will support the attainment of the activity's goals.
3. Information Requirements Planning. Top management
determines what information is needed to effectively
manage the activity. The determination is based on a
12

strategic direction established during Strategic
Requirements Planning and this step enables the
commanding officer to identify information require-
ment alternatives and priorities for the activity.
4. Current Syjstems Evaluation. Only through a thorough
understanding cf the organization's present informa-
tion flows will the command be able to forecast the
system architecture required of the future informa-
tion system. The process involves reviewing and
documenting all present manual methods, as well as
all currently installed automated systems.
5. Appoint an Information Analysis Project Team. A
small, central group should coordinate the informa-
tion analysis to ensure that an organized and struc-
tured approach be established to evaluate and
categorize all information needs. This group would
normally consist of the XO, information systems
manager (ISM) , and department heads.
6« Information Analysis. Information Analysis is a
methodology which incorporates top management stra-
tegic direction to identify the data required for
effective organizational control. The purpose of
such an analysis is to consolidate the information
requirements from each functional area, to avoid
redundancy of data if possible, and identify what
data is required from each functional area to perform
the decision- making process in a more efficient and
effective manner.
The following two pages are one of the checkoff lists
presented in the thesis. This small offering provides an
insight into the content and format of the ''bullet" tables
that follow Chapter VII, and allows the reader an opportu-
nity to contemplate hew the Tables might aid the commanding







What is it going to do for the activity, for
individual managers?
Define your philosophy, your goals and what the
project will do.
What policies and procedures will be used to impart
your philosophy throughout the acvtivity?
EMPHASIZE THE LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE
IRM will not be implemented overnight, but rather,
over a timeframe defined in months.
IRM must be viewed as an evolutionary process that
will depend on the current organization and its mode
cf operation.
lour view towards IRM will change through time.
The present organization must be viewed in terms of
the future.
DEVELOP AN EDUCATION PROGRAM
Hew do we educate the personnel of the command?




Command Support Development (cont'd)
DEVELOP A POASM
How detailed should this plan be?
Hew long a period should the plan cover?
Will the plan bring about control, which will
enable further time to plan?
Is the plan simple enough to succeed but specific
enough to structure the actions of the activity.
Do department heads feel that the PCASM is real-
istic?
APPOINT AN INFORMATION SYSTEM MANAGER
Is there a qualified person presently assigned
to the activity?
Is it possible tc hire a gualified person?
If a present staff member must be assigned,
can the person te expected to interact will
all departments impartially.
How much time will the staff member be able to
give to the project?
15

II- HIS1CRY OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Commanding officers of most shore activities 1 are pres-
ently attempting to bring these organizations into the
computer era. The many and varied advertized benefits of
microcomputers and office automation equipment have provided
the stimulus and justification for the procurement of thou-
sands cf dollars worth of hardware and software [Ref. 3: p.
5]. Microcomputers and other small computer systems are
finding widespread use throughout the Navy [Ref. 2: p. 13].
Corporate leaders of American industry, on the ether
hand, appear to be charting a course in a somewhat different
direction. The focus of corporate leaders is no longer on
hardware and the quantity of output. Instead, the emphasis
is on obtaining quality information. They are concerned with
how information can be accessed and used more effectively by
managers. [Ref. 4: p. 3] Management of the corporation's
information has become the critical issue. "Data as a
resource is moving from the pens of the theoreticions into
the recommendations cf the consultants and finally into the
accepted world of the executive" [Ref. 5: p. vii]. A review
of today's literature indicates that Information Resource
Management and Information Engineering are the buzz words of
the 1980's.
The reasons for the disparity between the present
emphasis cf corporate leaders and the commanding officers of
shore activities warrant a brief discussion.
1 Shore activities refers to those activities bounded
within the the Bases and Stations Project. i.e.,— Naval
stations, Naval bases and air stations.
16

B. GEOWTH OF THE COBPOTER
1 . American Business
American business identified the potential of the
computer at least as early as the 1960's. Corporations
created data processing centers and gradually expanded the
use of the computer. This expansion saw computers move from
the large nainframe unit to the departmental minicomputer
and then to the office microcomputer.
This expansion and growth process was described by
Richard 1. Nolan in his well known Harvard 3 usin ess R eview
article, "Managing the Crisis in Data Processing". Nolan
postulated that there are six stages of growth in an organi-
zation's DP function. These six stages cover the time from
inception of the computer into the organization to mature
management of all data resources [Ref. 6: pp. 1-8].
Additional information on Nolan's stages is provided in
Chapter IV.
As technology improved and the costs of hardware
decreased, computers and office automation equipment were
installed throughout many organizations. However, this
widespread use of small computer systems fueled the long
standing debate over centralized or decentralized computing.
Proponents of centralization argued that centralized
computing ensured efficiency and permitted effective service
to all users. Meanwhile, the proponents of decentralization
argued that decentralized arrangements were profitable and
improved departmental productivity. [Ref. 7: pp. 1-22]
As this debate continued, many corporations discov-
ered that there was only a limited capability of interaction
between this array of computers. Corporations were trying
to operate with unrelated and incompatible hardware and
software. Management had failed to recognize the critical
nature of controlling the computer resource. Management and
17

control cf the computer and the corporation's information
resource had been overlooked. [Ref. 7: p. 325]
2 • !§<|era 1 Government
The federal government began utilizing the computer at
much the same time as American industry. However, computer
applications in the federal government were quickly identi-
fied as being unique. The size, scope and complexity of
federal government applications presented serious questions
in areas such as planning, policy, design and procurement.
Solutions to these diverse questions were not easily found.
In fact, confusion and disagreement followed any attempt to
find the best means of improvement. As a result, Congress
and the central management agencies { Office of Management
and Budget and the General Services Administration ) , chose
a "hard line" approach. Regulation was chosen as the best
method cf controlling and managing the federal computer
resource. [Ref. 8: pp. 1-8]
C. FEDERAL REGU LA TIC US
Commanding officers of shore activities must comply with
both federal regulations, as well as Department of Defense
regulations. This dual centralized bureaucracy has
restricted and discouraged innovative thinking in both
computer applications and management [Ref. 8: p. 19].
The impact of the various federal regulations has
created severe problems throughout the federal government.
The age cf some major computer systems is an example of one
such problem. Dramatic improvements have been made in
computer technology; yet, many government systems still
operate as originally installed. [Ref. 8: pp. 21-27] The
National Academy of Science (NAS) found obsolescence to be a
major problem effecting the Navy. The NAS report stated:
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Too many Navy installations are operating with computing
equipment produced in the 1960s; two generations of
computers have been developed since then [Ref. 2: p. 41.
A specific example may be the Navy's supply system. The
Navy Supply Systems computer systems have been described as
technically out of date, overburdened and the achilles heel
of the supply system [Ref. 9: p. 56].
A review of the major federal computer regulations
allows the reader to grasp the magnitude of this centralized
control. This review will also provide an insight into the
commanding officer's perspective and a possible reason why
most shore activities are only now progressing beyond the
word processing stage.
1 . The Brooks Act
The Erooks Act of 1965 established the basic framework
for federal computer applications. Three agencies, General
Services Administration (GSA) , the Office of Management and
Budget (CMB) , and the National Bureau of Standards (NBS)
,
were given significant authority over government-wide
computer activities. The Brocks Act tasked each agency with
specific responsibilities:
1. OMB— overall policy guidance;
2. GSA
—
procurement , funding, and disposal;
3. NES--development of federal information processing
standards. [Ref. 8: p. 20]
This highly centralized structure of authority and
responsibilities resulted in a magnitude of difficulties at
all levels of federal computer applications. A major diffi-
culty was that the procurement process that evolved froai the
Brooks Act was long and complicated, and actually lengthened
the time it took to procure equipment [Ref. 9: p. 59]. In
addition, the constant scrutiny by higher authority
19

restricted agency and activity managers by allowing little
room for operational level decisions. Areas as wide spread
and diverse as procurement and personnel management were
subject to federal micromanagement. [Ref. 8: pp. 21-23]
2 • The Paperwork Reduction Act
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, provided some needed
guidance in the area of computer management. This law, in
addition to strengthening the government's efforts at paper-
work management, mandated the preparation of a five year
plan for data processing and telecommunications. [Ref. 8:
pp. 9]
This law implies .that federal agencies have not
utilized strategic planning in managing the computer
resource. Some critics have been much more specific.
Robert V. Head stated: "Attempts at strategic planning by
federal agencies have. ..been sporadic and largely ineffec-
tive" [Ref. 8: p. 9]- A committee from the National Academy
of Sciences studied .the Navy's Nontactical Automated Data
Processing Policy, Organization, and Management and found
much the same problem.
NAVCAC (and indeed all aspects of the Navy and the
government/congressional procurement/oversight process)
appears to have been too rigidly focused on computer
hardware and, to a lesser extent, applications software,
while having paid tco little attention to policy devel-
opment, strategic planning, and the potential of
management-level information systems [Ref. 2: p. 15].
The Paperwork Reduction Act also addressed the concept of
information management. Each agency is required to desig-
nate a single individual who is responsible for all the
agency's information systems. This is to include data
processing, records management, forms control, and all areas
dealing with information. [Ref. 8: p. 34]
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3 • The L§dera 2 LuL2£llii2H Resource f*anagener,t
Regulation (FIR MR)
The Federal Information Resource Management Regulation
(EIRMR) is the most recent regulation in the area cf infor-
mation resources. Effective 1 April 1984, this regulation
provides a single directive concerning the effective manage-
ment of automatic data processing, office automation,
records management and telecommunications. Its emphasis is
on managing information throughout the life cycle (from
collection or creation to disposal) . This regulation is
intended to provide a single, logically organized directive
on Information Resource Management. [Ref. 10: p. 20994]
D. WHAT IS THE ISSOE ?
The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 and the FIRMR,
address some of the management and control problems that
industry has had previously, and are presently experiencing.
These problems surfaced as small computer systems gained
widespread use throughout organizations. Why then, is there
now the proliferation of microcomputers at most shore activ-
ities? Is this a rational approach based upon industry's
documented problems?
1 . The Activity Per s pective
The authors contend that the present proliferation of
microcomputers at the activity level can be attributed to
the fact that the Navy has not provided concise and workable
guidance on managing the computer resource. The Eases and
Stations Architecture indicates that the Navy is now looking
to provide this guidance [Ref. 11: unmarked]. However, the
authors perceive that it could be as long as 2-5 years
before it will be fully implemented at the activity level.
In the interim, there exists a critical need for guidance at
the activity level. The NAS reported,
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Units at various levels within the Navy appear to have
no place to turn to receive good advice oh how their
information systems might best be developed technically
or to receive appropriate guidance in making the tasfc
changes that information systems require [ Ref . 2: p. 10].
This lack of guidance has perpetuated an activity perspec-
tive that is not consistent with that presently being imple-
mented at the agency level of the government or the major
systems command level of DOD.
The increased visibility of command of a major shore
activity has contributed to this perspective. The implemen-
tation of the "Major Shore Command" policy in 1980, recog-
nized the importance of this position and the critical need
to ensure that only top performers were given these
assignments. [Ref. 12: pp. 1-3]
The authors contend that this high level visibility
has lead to an increased interest in shore activity manage-
ment. Commanding officers are looking for methods to
improve their decisicE making and the productivity of their
organizations. In this regards, they are turning tc the
computer.
The authors feel that there are additional factors that
have contributed to the increasing trend toward computeriza-
tion. The following factors are particularly noteworthy:
1. Procurement regulations have been eased.
2. Hardware costs have continued to decrease.
3. The computer is perceived as the answer to any and
all problems.
4. The Bases and Stations Architecture encourages
commanding officers to procure microcomputers.
5. Labor costs have continued to increase.
In the authors' opinion, this trend towards increased
computerization is net consistent with the guidance provided
22

in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1-980, the PIBMR, or the
findings of industry. The reason for the inconsistency is
that these regulations are directed at the large scale
applications found at the agency level of government. They
are not addressed to the individual activity or command.
Guidance for individual activities or commands will only be
prepared after each agency is able to develop its own guide-
lines. This process is time consuming and mired in the
bureaucratic process.
E. A EEAHEWOHK FOE IBPBOVEMENT
Many shore activities are presently caught up in moving
from the "manual method" to the computer era. Management
and ccntrol of the computer resource is not presently a
problem. However, the warning signs are unmistakable. In
the opinion of the authors, activities must follow a method-
ology in their transition to the computer age. Failure to
do so will result in wasted resources, increased user
dissatisfaction, and will seriously impede the eventual
transition to the information era.
Planning is critical to this process. Industry has
recognized this fact and the upper levels of government are
also acknowledging this requirement. This thesis addresses
this problem and provides a methodology that is applicable
for use by the activity level commanding officer and staff.
The methodology will be directed at the implementation of
small computer systems. It is designed for incorporating
the microcomputer into an effective information system.
Although this methodology does not specifically address
office automation and telecommunications, the methodology
has seme general applications to these areas.
23

III. THE CC5MANDING 0FFICER1S DILEMMA
A. ISTRCDUCTION
The Commanding Cfficer of a major shore activity is
responsible for coordinating the many and varied functions
of his organization. The diversity of these functions
places the commanding officer of most shore activities in a
role similar to that of a "city manager". However, the
commanding officer is a professional military officer who
normally has not had the training and experience of most
city managers.
It is the opinion of the authors that command of a irajor
shore activity is a particularly difficult assignment for
most commanding officers. Success in this environment
depends on the commanding officer 1 s ability to demonstrate
both effective leadership and management throughout his
organization.
The authors would contend that effective management of
this complex organization can be greatly enhanced by the use
of automated systems and the realization that information,
next to his personnel, is the commanding officer f s most
important resource. In addition to the tralitional trans-
action type applications, the use of automated technologies
can improve decision Baking by giving the commanding officer
and his principal department heads, the right information,
at the right time and at the most economical cost.
Various forms of office automation equipment and micro-
computers are now being utilized by most shore commands
[Ref. 2: p. 13]. However, the transition from the tradi-
tional "manual system" to an automated system may involve a
certain degree of confusion in an organization. In most
24

cases, there are a number of problems that must be antici-
pated. These problems may be technological in nature (e.g.,
inadequate or incompatible equipment ) , but many problem
areas will be largely managerial. [Ref. 13: p. 1] In this
regards, the most significant problem will be that many
commanding officers may have to alter their view of
information [Ref. 2: p. 3].
In the opinion of the authors, the above paragraphs
describe a scenario that places many commanding officers of
shore activities in a precarious dilemma.
This chapter will present an explanation of the organi-
zational structure of a typical shore activity. It will
serve to display the magnitude and complexity of the envi-
ronment in which a commanding officer must operate. It will
also discuss a typical commanding officer's career progres-
sion and training. The final part of the chapter will
address a number of issues that the authors perceive as
obstacles to a commanding officer who may attempt to control
his information resource.
The purpose of this chapter is to enable the reader to
comprehend the scope of a major shore activity and the
commanding officer's background, in order that an evaluation
can be developed as to the need for Information Resource
Management and the inherent difficulties that a commanding
officer faces in implementing such a system.
E. SHORE COMMAHDS
1 • Organization
The commanding officer of a shore activity is
responsible under Navy Regulations for the accomplishment of
his command's mission. This mission, for a typical naval
station , can be stated as:
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....to provide, as appropriate, logistic support for
the operating forces of the Navy and for dependent
activities and other commands as assigned [Ref. 60: p.
1].
This broad statement tasks the commanding officer
with responsibility fcr a wide range of diverse functions.
Phase 1 of OP-094's Eases and Stations Architecture identi-
fied seventeen functions as applicable to typical naval
shore activities [Ref. 11: unmarked]- These functions are





















Earely will the commanding officer of a shore
activity be responsible for all seventeen of these func-
tions. Instead, the specific mission of his command will
determine the exact functions that he must coordinate.
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However, functions such as supply,- staff civil engineer,
security and administration are typically common to all
activities [Ref. 11: unmarked].
Figure 3. 1 depicts the organizational chart for
Naval Station, Norfolk, Virginia, and serves to illustrate
the various functional areas for which a typical commanding
officer is responsible.
The authors contend that Figure 3.1 does not fully
illustrate some vital organizational aspects of a shore
command. A commanding officer must deal with both tenant
commands and certain specialized commands. These activi-
ties, though not directly under the control of the
commanding officer or even geographically located within his
command, may provide a valuable service to the commanding
officer. Consequently, he must constantly review and
monitor the service provided by these activities.
In addition, Figure 3.1 does not convey a number of
aspects of the commanding officer's city manager role. :iany
commanding officers are responsible for a large number of
military family quarters. In many cases, this involves
providing municipal services, utilities, recreation and
security. The commanding officer must manage this area a's
economically as possible; while at the same time, recog-
nizing the impact that this area has on the morale of his
military personnel. [Ref. 13: p. 23]
Shore activities, particularly the industrial and
large operating bases, are major consumers of energy. A
shore commander must provide innovative and effective meas-
ures tc conserve his energy resources. In the future, this
area is likely to receive an increasing amount of visi-
bility. This concern, just as the makeup of managing family






























































































[Hef . 60: Chart 1 ]
Figure 3,1 Organizational Chart— NAVSTA Norfolk
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A final critical role is not- evident from the organ-
izational chart--the commanding officer's civic responsibil-
ities. Since the commanding officer is frequently the
senior officer in a community, he is often looked upon as
the chief executive officer of a large business in the
community. He must therefore maintain a close and active
role in civic affairs. However, this is not to be taken
lightly. It is a role where the commanding officer is
subject to public scrutiny and often a target for the poli-
tics which ebb and flew around him. [Ref. 13: p. 24]
C. CAREER DEVELOPMENT
1 . Dutv Assignments
The commanding officer of a major shore activity is
a professional military officer who has ascended through a
career path involving many different assignments. This
career progression will vary considerably depending upon the
commanding officer's warfare specialty. Figure 3.2 through
Figure 3.4 provides standard career paths for various
warfare communities. James Hodges [Ref. 14: p. 38],
reviewed the career progression for all unrestricted line
officers and found that a typical career included:
1. A major command assignment around the 22-year mark,
2. Over 50% of service time will be in afloat/squadrons
or in training for these units,
3. A Washington tour as a ICDR or above and,
4. A high percentage of subspecialty and staff duty for
shore duty assignments.
The authors contend that the duty assignments of
most cemmanding officers have not adequately prepared them
for the challenge cf managing a major shore activity.
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Figure 3.2 Surface Warfare Career Path.
prepare the officer for operational tours as executive
officer and commanding officer.
Various other authors support this contention.
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Figure 3.3 Aviation Career Path.
i
for sea/sguadron assignments is primarily operationally
oriented and specifically structured to develop the offi-
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[Ref. 13: p. 20 ], openly questioned the logic behind the
premise that an officer was qualified to take over the reins
of a major shore command without substantial or meaningful
experience in the complex and specialized management demands
of such an organization.
Shore duty assignments may be operationally
oriented, but for most officers, they are likely to be in
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other areas. Postgraduate education, instructor duty, staff
duty and sub-specialty utilization represent some of the
areas in which an officer will gain shore duty experience.
These tours are normally assigned with regard to increasing
responsibility, thereby enhancing an officers promotional
opportunities based upon professional performance.
[Ref. 14: p. 44]
The authors have offered this brief discussion to
permit the reader to contrast the organization of a shore
command with the previous assignments of a typical officer
who may command a shore activity. The authors cannot
discount the fact that excellent management and leadership
skills were developed during the commanding officers opera-
tional tours. The authors* purpose is to give the reader an
indication of the focus of assignments most commanding offi-
cers may have experienced prior to assuming responsibility
for the shore activity.
2. Formal Training
Formal training for the commanding officer of a
major shcre activity was initiated in May 1978, when the
Navy Civilian Personnel Command (NCPC) offered the first
Prospective Commanding Officer (PCO) Shore Management
Training Program. This three week course consisted of pres-
entations addressing the various resource areas that a
commanding officer could expect to encounter at a typical
shore command.
This course is presently offered three times a year.
Prospective commanding officers of major commands are
required to attend and are given priority for obtaining
quotas. Commanding officers of other shore commands may
utilize the remaining quotas, with prospective executive
officers of shore activities given the opportunity of
filling any unused quotas. As of July 1984, 528
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individuals 2 have completed the course.
It is the authors 1 contention that the PCO Shore
Station Management Program is a positive step in preparing
commanding officers for the challenges of managing a shore
activity. However, the topic of information systems was not
discussed until the Hay 1984 session. The authors feel that
the exclusion of this topic for such a long time, has
contributed to the confusion and difficulties now being
experienced by many commanding officers who are trying to
implement various information systems or Information
Resource Management in particular. The authors feel that
this topic is of major importance and that the commanding
officer's need for training, education, and specific
guidance in this area will only increase. In the future, as
additional activities enter the "information age", it is




The previous sections of this chapter have provided
an insight into the complexity of the commanding officer's
environment, as well as a glimpse of a commanding officer's
previous duties and training. The authors feel that both of
these topics must be considered when attempting to evaluate
the commanding officer's ability to effectively implement an
Information Resource Management system. However, the
following issues, although less obvious, are also of
concern.
2This information obtained in a 27 August 1984 phone




The average tour length for a commanding officer
is 24-36 months [Rei:. 15: p. 32]. It is the authors opinion
that this relatively short period of time does not allow a
commanding officer to become actively involved in all the
various functional areas. He must instead, rely en the
various department heads for guidance and recommendations.
The commanding officer will focus his attention on those
projects that he perceives to have an immediate urgency or
on projects that can be easily completed during his "watch".
It is not the authors' desire to imply that
focusing on urgent or high priority matters justifies criti-
cism. Instead, this fact is brought out in order that the
reader may see that a large part of the commanding officer's
time is reactive [Rc»f. 16: p. 91]. This reactive nature of
the commanding officer's job may preclude him from active
involvement in the implementation of an automated informa-
tion system.
In addition, the authors contend that many
commanding officers will perceive the time required for the
planning, documentation, and installation of an information
system to be overwhelming and of little benefit from their
short term perspective. As a result, they will net support
Information Resource Management or they will delegate
responsibility to such a low level that success is impos-
sible. In either case, the short tour length, and the resul-
tant short term perspective, impacts the commanding
officer's view when considering implementation of an auto-
mated information system.
b. Types of Information
The authors contend that a commanding officer of
an ashore activity must be concerned with two broad types of
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information. The first type is the information that is
required to produce the reports for higher authorities. The
information that the commanding officer needs to effectively
manage his command forms the second type of information.
The information that is required by higher
authority is fairly well defined. The centralized structure
of the Navy provides a chain of command that normally
prescribes specific reporting requirements. However, this
must be contrasted with the managerial requirements of the
commanding officer. The information that the commanding
officer needs to effectively manage his command is much more
illusive. In most cases, the CO must extract this from the
reams of reports that cross his desk. Reports, that are in
many cases what subordinates perceive that the commanding
officer needs or wants [Ref. 36: p. 46].
The authors contend that a commanding officer
attempting to implement an Information Resource Management
system must recognize the existence of these two types of
information. The information used to prepare the reports to
higher authority is, in most or many cases, also vital to
his needs. However, these reports are normally in a format
that is not meaningful or useful to decision making at the
activity level. Consequently, he must ensure that strict
attention is given tc providing him the information that he
needs and can use; while at the same time, minimizing
duplication and overlap because the requirements for such
information may not be fully cocrdinated.
c. Staff Guidance
Chapter II discussed the fact that commanders at
the activity level have no source of guidance on how to
develop or improve an information system. This is viewed by
the authors as a major problem; one that presently contrib-
utes to such problems as incompatibility, poor documentation
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and inconsistent information gathering. However, this situ-
ation is further complicated by the fact that the commanding
officer has limited guidance and assistance in the general
management of his command. He is accustomed to the opera-
tional Navy where specific rules and regulations were avail-
able; where he was expected to accomplish his mission, but
always knew where to turn for assistance. However, the
commanding officer is in a new environment. An environment
where the lack of technical support is only part of his
problem; secondary in some cases, to the fact that he lacks
specific management guidance from his military superiors.
In dealing with the myriad of problems that
confront him, the commanding officer interfaces with not
only his immediate nilitary superiors, but with the Civil
Service Commission, an array of bureaus, agencies, boards
and other offices. He often falls victim to duplicative and
overlapping guidance on many issues. It can be said that he
is in an environment where he must answer to what seems to
be an endless line of "bosses". His natural sources of
guidance and assistance are the various military staffs.
However, those on the military staffs to whom he must refer
his problems, frequently know less about managing a shore
activity than he does [Ref. 13: p. 21].
The authors contend that the lack of both tech-
nical guidance and general management guidance are problems
for a commanding officer in implementing Information
Resource Management. While the technical guidance issue is
being addressed, there appears to be little improvement in
the area of managerial guidance. As a result, the
commanding officer must structure any attempt at information
management on the realization that he must determine his own
priorities, establish his own goals, and meld the dollars,
people and resources at his command to accomplish his activ-




A commanding officer attempting to implement an
automated information system must be aware of the issues
that fuel the debate over centralization versus decentrali-
zation of an organization's information resources. This
debate has flourished for a number of years in the informa-
tion systems community and has generally concluded that
there is no "best" solution for an organization.
Regardless, the centralization issue is generally recognized
as having three separate aspects:
1. Control-- concerns the location of decision making in
the organization,
2. Location-- concerns the site of equipment,
3. Function-- refers to the position of an activity
within the structure of an organization [Ref. 7: p.
321].
The authors contend that it is vital for a
commanding officer to recognize the implications of these
issues. However, the authors perceive that the critical
issue for a commanding officer of a major shore activity is
the highly centralized and administratively complex nature
of the U.S. Navy. Although the responsibility and autonomy
of an individual commander is often cited as an indication
of decentralization, the fact remains that the Navy is
highly centralized in many matters. The stringent
regulations imposed on most applications of automated infor-
mation systems, as discussed in Chapter II, is a prime
example of this fact.
A commanding officer who is interested in imple-
menting an automated information system should logically
follow a systems approach. However, the authors contend
that in most cases, this will end in the requirement to
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request authorization from some higher authority-
Regardless of whether the request is for approval of the
project or for additional funding to support the project,
the bureaucratic process is time consuming and unpopular.
Instead, it is easier to take a piecemeal or incremental
approach; i.e., funding equipment whenever possible. 3ut,
unfortunately, this can lead to incompatibility or user
dissatisfaction as the command must decide such questions as
which department gets "automated" first, or what equipment
to procure. However, this approach has become even more
popular as the cost of small computer systems has decreased.
The debate over centralization or decentralization of an
organization's information resource has yet to be resolved,
and will be around for some time [ Ref . 7: p. 319]. The
authors' intent in this discussion is to give the reader an
indication of the additional implications facing the
commanding officer of a shore activity.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Chapter III has offered the reader a brief overview of
the scope of a major shore command, an insight into the
career progression of the individuals who command them, and
a discussion of various factors that impact on a commanding
officer's view of information management. The authors
contend that the first two topics combine to make a major
shore command a difficult assignment for many commanding
officers. However, the commanding officer's task becomes
substantially more difficult when coupled with the complica-




2. Dual information requirements,
3. A lack of staff guidance and,
4. The centralization versus decentralization issue.
39

These additional factors bound a scenario where the
commanding officer is in a precarious dilemma.
This chapter was developed solely to permit the reader
to formulate a view as to the need for informatior. manage-
ment and the inherent difficulties in implementing an auto-
mated information system. Chapter IV will offer the reader




17. INFOE RATI ON RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
A. HISTORY
Over 400 years ago, Machiavelli observed:
It must be considered that there is nothing more diffi-
cult to carry out. nor more doubtful of success, nor more
dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things.
For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the
eld order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who
could profit by the new order. This lukewarmness arises
partly from fear of their adversaries, who have the laws in
their favor, and partly from the incredulity of mankind, who
do not truly believe in anything new until they have had an
actual experience of it. [Ref. 18: p. 385]
Information is an ingredient vital to good management.
The sharply reduced cost of computer technology and " the
rapid improvements in the availability of useful technolo-
gies in the telecommunications and office automation areas,
have created a very real opportunity to improve the effec-
tiveness of corporate and nonprofit management through
improved use of information by management. However, this
opportunity has been difficult to exploit in the past two
decades, and if anything, the task is becoming more
difficult. [Ref. 4: p. 1]
The technological advances from the vacuum tube, to
transistors, to integrated circuits and the complexities of
the micrcelectronics technologies, have continued to advance
and will impact en our way of life for years to come. But,
additionally, over the past 30 years, the rapid evolution
and spread of information systems technologies, has created
a major, new set of managerial changes. Virtually all
major, currently accepted conceptual frameworks for thinking
about how to manage information have been developed since
1971 [Ref. 19: p. 11. The earliest commercial application
41

of a computer information system occurred in 1952. Thirty
years is a very short time for a new management profession
to develop to maturity when one considers the amount of
knowledge and change that has occurred in the fields of
marketing, accounting, finance, and production, since their
humtle beginnings in the early 1900' s.
In the early 60's and 70 f s, senior management, blinded
by the cloud of technological jargon surrounding the
computer field, abdicated its responsibilities somewhat, and
let the data processing function grow as they attempted to
come to grips with the information dilemma. Data
processing, unfiltered by management control in many cases,
produced predictable results. In too many cases, data
processing became a bureaucratic empire, outside the main-
stream of the organization, unresponsive to managements
requirements as well as being economically unmanageable.
[Ref. 20: p. 78]
Information was first placed in purely economic terms in
1963 by Adrian H. McEonough, a professor at the University
of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Finance and Commerce.
The professor coined the phrase "information economics" to
describe the notion of effectively using both stored knowl-
edge and information obtained through data processing. The
concept placed information in a purely economic framework by
emphasizing the need to understand the demand for and the
supply of information [Eef. 21: p. 15]. In classical
economic terms, the factors of production were viewed as
land, labor, and capital. In the modern age, these have
become men, money, machines and material. In the future, it
is safe to assume that information will be added, if it
hasn't already, as the fifth factor of production [Ref. 1:
p. 51].
Information processing activities account for about 70
percent of U.S. employment, and also account for more than
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46 percent of the Gross National Product, according to
recent figures froir the National Science Foundation
[Ref. 21: p. 15]. But most proponents of information as a
resource, would be quick to point out that Management
Information Systems (MIS), supposedly already provides the
information desired when required. Current computer instal-
lations all purport to be information systems, and the
majority of these in turn claim to be MIS's. A functional
definition of a MIS might read: "A management information
system is a formal system in the organization which provides
management with the necessary reports to be utilized in the
decision-making process" [Ref. 22: p. 192].
While any information system may collect, store,
process, structure, and retrieve data, the ultimate goal of
the system is to provide information for managers to assist
them in making decisions. While most MIS's attempt to
support managers in making decisions, the system in some in-
stances may also make some of the repetitive decisions
usually made at the lower levels of the 'organization
[Eef. 24: p. 4]. Proponents of Information Resource
Management feel that IRM will not follow the footsteps of
MIS. The latter allowed information to be isolated from the
real world. IRM, if implemented correctly, forces informa-
tion to mirror reality. [Ref. 29: p. 74]
While there may be some arguments among data processor
and information system managers as to the "correct" defini-
tion of MIS, most all will agree that management information
systems have failed for the most part, to provide the infor-
mation as advertised. This is not totally unexpected, since
all technological and innovative uses of systems must have a
testing period. Reasons for this failure include:
1. Lack of management involvement. Most studies indi-
cate that information systems that succeed were
43

precisely those in which top management participated.
Involvement included strategic planning, organiza-
tional arrangements, detailed operating plans and
budgets, as well as follow-up to ensure compliance.
[Pef. 22: p. 229]
2. Resistance to change. Unless users are persuaded
that the information system and its associated
computer (s) , as a resource, can help them perform
their duties in a more efficient and effective
matter, they will not be receptive to computer solu-
tions to problems. [Ref. 18: p. 590]
3. Lack of qualified information systems managers. !*ost
information managers were former data processing
personnel that had great technical expertise in the
computing field, but lacked formal education in the
management techniques as well as close scrutiny from
the organization as any other functional area is
required to have. [Ref. 23: p. 58]
The best known model of evolution related to information
systems is the "stage" model developed by Richard Nolan.
This model, which first appeared in print in 1973, has been
cited extensively as the major statement about the growth of
information systems in organizations. From its beginnings
as a tentative hypothesis [Ref. 25: p. 402], the model had
become regarded as empirically grounded theory by 1979
[Ref. 26: p. 115], and an accepted description of how
changes in organizational information systems take place
over time [Ref. 27: p. 48]. Figure 4.1 provides an example.
Not all authors agree with Nolan's models though:
The Nolan model has had a powerful influence on the
information systems field. Its popularity is probably
due to its bold approach to dealing with a phenomenon ox
great complexity in a straight-forward and clever
manner. Nolan was the first researcher to introduce a
structured scheme for explaining the growth of com-
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of data resources is implemented.
Information resource manaqement is
emphasized. Stable data models are
created with strong user par-
ticipation in the data administration
process. More application retro-
fitting is needed to conform to
these. Data spun off into Class IV
data bases provides Flexible and
valuable information and decision
support systems.
STAGE 4i INTEGRATION
E*istinq applications are retrofitted to data base
technology. Successful Class III data bases and
data models lead to a fundamental chanqe in the
way applications are developed. Users obtain
more valuable information from terminals and
consequently increase their demands on DP.
There is increased DP e«penditure and growth.
Redundancies of data and lack of organ-
Uationwide information analysis complicate or
frustrate attempts to build control and planmnq
applications.
STAGE 3s CONTROL
The effects of lax control become felt. Users are frustrated
in their demands for information.
_ Senior and middle" manage-
ment cannot obtain information they need for decision-making.
Management attempts to gain control, upgrading docu-
mentation, restructuring existing applications, introducing data
base management, formalizing the planning and control.
Maintenance costs grow very high. There is a long appli-
cation backlog. There is slow application growth while DP is
restructuring and rebuilding. The need for data administration
is vaguely perceived but little effective action is taken.
STAGE 2i CONTAGION
Crowing demand for, and proliferation of, applications. Enthusiastic
development. Application* developed in isolation. Proliferation of incom-
patible and redundant data. Lax control. Mo overall planning.
STAGE It INITIATION
Initial development of first application* - mostly coat-reducinq functional application*
such as accounting, payroll, order control, invoicing. No overall DP control.
[Bef. 28: p. 81]
Figure U.1 Six Stages of Growth in Data Processing,
Identified by Nolan.
to practitioners and researchers alike. But it is
incomplete in its attempt to capture the larger organi-
zational context within which computing occurs, and it
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is not accurate in the accounting of the relationshipsbetween the various components in this context.[Eef. 30: p. 474]
A large portion of the state of the art organizations
are in the latter portions of stage 4 or the beginning of
stage 5, where Information Resource Management is empha-
sized. Closer scrutiny of the model, reveals that the
United States Navy as a whole, might be located in the
latter portions of stage 2 or the early stages of stage 3
[Eef. 31: p. 1], Possible reasons for this disparity were
covered in Chapter II of this thesis. Assuming that it is
necessary for an organization to pass through the Nolan
stages, though a minimum or maximum time limit for traversal
is not implied, it becomes the authors* opinion that the
U.S. Navy being in the lower stages of Nolan's model might
be considered as a blessing. The reasoning behind this
statement, is that the implementers of new information
systems (IS) within the U.S. Navy can learn from the
mistakes of past implementations of information systems.
With these "lessons" in mind, the Navy can use accepted and
proven methodologies to possibly pass through stages 3
through 5 with minimal time and impediment to the organiza-
tion. Enroute, the Navy will become the beneficiaries of
mature systems that have become a part of the overall struc-
ture of the organization as the IS strives to serve the
needs of the users.
In the earlier years of data processing, originally an
organization sent its requests along with the information
required, to the data processing center. It was massaged,
lines of code produced, and the result was sent back tc the
user. With technological advances came wider uses and
demand of data in the form of useful information which
ushered in the HIS era. Presently, the office automation
venues, local area networks and increased data processing
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capabilities, has given rise to the microcomputer, which has
placed great potential information power in the hands of
expectant users. This has usherel in a new concept termed
Information Resource Management (IRM) , that has premised
important implications for its DP and MIS predecessors.
[Ref. 32: p. 94]
B. WHY INFORHATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT?
Today, many corporations and institutions are quite
satisfied with their data processing capabilities and so
they should be; through much hard work these data
processing capabilities have become very effective.
Nevertheless, the trap to which many executives in these
companies may fall victim is the belief that information
needs and requirements for information management during
the 1980*5 can be satisfied by the principles and tech-
niques that are proving successful today. It is assumed
that the agent that will allow current" directions to be
maintained is technology itself, cheap minicomputers and
new communications potential. But technology itself is
not the total answer for the future. [Ref. 1: p. 50]
Computing power is becoming relatively cheaper as labor
costs rise .(see Figure 4.2), providing some impetus to
computerization. [Ref. 18: p. 10]. So the question
becomes, how does the organization manage this vast cauldron
of information that is available to the manager, if the
manager assumes that the organization will have fewer
personnel in which to use on any specific problem? For FY
85, 28 percent of the DOD budget will be utilized in the
payment of personnel costs [Ref. 33: p. 578]. Granted, a
certain percentage cf that slice was payment to retirees,
but the connotation is clear that commanding officers can no
longer approach problem solutions using the old axicrs of
putting more people on the job to ensure the successful
completion cf the project— the people just aren't available
[Ref. 31: p. 2].
But, further examination cf the term "computing pewer"




"ADDroximate: dashed lines are extrapolations.
1980 1985
[Ref. 18: p. 10]
Figure 4.2 Labor and Computing Costs.
use the terms "computer costs", "computer power", etc., the
publications are only referring to the hardware costs.
Granted, hardware costs have decreased dramatically over the
last two decades, but the systems or lifecycle costs have
increased at an inverse proportion to the hardware costs.
Software and software maintenance costs have reached
dramatic proportions and the production backlog in these
areas are estimated at a 2-5 years delay [Ref. 34: p. 88].
Barry Boehm claims that in 1955 computer hardware costs
dominated software costs 7:1, but by 1985 software costs are
expected to dominate hardware costs 9:1 [Ref. 35: p. 17].
Figure 4.3 refers.
This is a dramatic reversal, with equally dramatic
effects on perceptions about the costs of computing






[Kef. 35: p. 18]
Figure 4.3 Hardware/Software Cost Trends.
software, and so this shift has reduced the entry costs
of computing. Start-up has become comparatively less
costly than successfully implementing computer systems,
that meet organizational needs. Computing now appears
to many decision makers as inexpensive, But a closer
look reveals that it is not so. [Ref. 7: pp. 329-330]
In 1979, The Diebold Group, Inc., coined the term
Information Resource Management (IRM) , as their view cf how
the corporate management of the future would handle informa-
tion in more effective and efficient ways than organizations
had done in the past [Ref. 23: p. 58]- The Group made the
distinction that the inference was not in reference to data,
but to information, which was considered the analysis and
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synthesis of data [Ref. 1: p. 50]. The founder, John
Biebold, based this concept on a passage written by Johann
Wolfgang Von Goethe in 1810. "The modern age has a false
sense of superiority because of the great mass of data at
its disposal, but the valid criterion of distinction is
rather the extent to which man knows how to form and master
the material at his command " [Ref. 1: p. 51].
"The importance of information cannot be overstated,"
[Ref. 20: p. 78], states John J. Connell. He goes en to
discuss hov organizations are presently in an information
age where the work fcrce is increasingly made up of people
who work with information. Workers are besieged on all
sides by new information sources, while better information
might provide the competitive edge that ensures the success
of the organization. Information can be thought of as a
resource, an asset, a commodity, a national treasure, power,
money, and possibly knowledge [Ref. 36: p. 56]. It is ail
of the above. It is none of the above. The reader could
also state that information is unique in that it has no
value in itself. One can determine its value by those that
use it and that value can vary over time. The same cannot
be said of other corporate resources— the value of informa-
tion is in the minds cf its users [Ref. 37: p. 112]. Eut
above all else, information must be managed if it is to
prove its worth in the future. "It is clear that the organ-
izations that will excel in the 80's will be those that
recognize information as a major resource and structure it
as efficiently as they do other assets " [Ref. 1 : p. 51].
C. DEFINITIONS OF INFORMATION RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Information Resource Management (IRM) , has been defined
in widely differing ways by different authorities. There is
probably no definition on which all authorities would agree,
due tc its unique nature as well as newness on the scene.
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Some definitions are as follows: -
IRM seeks to identify the common patterns of information
that exist in the organization, to integrate these
varied patterns across the total organization into a
coherent whole, and to provide guidance in the form of
standards and conventions to make the best use of infor-
mation owned by the organization. [Ref. 38: p. 46]
IRM ...is expected to include the data processing, word
processing, data and voice communication, mail and other
related administrative functions. [Ref. 23: p. 58]
IRM has been defined as 'a state of mind, 1 an attitude
that considers information as important as any other
vital corporate resource. [Ref. 29: p. 72]
The objective of information resource management (IRM)
is not to manage knowledge, nor is it really to manage
inf ormation-though that is what the phrase imclies.
IRM's objective is to manage, store, give a.ccess to, and
provide the abilitv to manipulate and communicate the
raw material of information and knowledge: data.
[Ref. 39: p. 225]
Information resource management is a management function
to develop and implement policies, programs, guidelines
to plan for, manage, and control information and infor-
mation resources. [ Ref- **0: P- 13]
IRM is the discipline of comprehensively managing an
enterprise's information requirements. using contempo-
rary technology in the most profitable way. irm has
five distinct but interdependent management functions-
human resources, planning, data, applications, and
networks. [Ref. 41: p. 175]
51

IRM is simply the ability of management to come up with
accurate information, at the right time and at the
lowest cost. [Ref. 21: p. 15]
Managing the information resource essentially means
gathering, storing and processing data so efficiertly
and effectively that organizations produce the best
information with which to make decisions and take
actions-both on operational and corporate levels.
[Ref- 34: p. 88]
The Information Resources Management System can be
viewed as a framework within which to accomplish the
management of data resources in an orderly and system-
atic fashion. [Ref. 36: p. 99]
Information resource management, in our view, involves
the integration of diverse disciplines, technologies,
data bases, and other information handling resources.
[Ref. 4: p. 8]
Information resource management is the process of
managing information in an organization so as to
maximize its goals. [Ref. 40: p. 43]
A (computer-based) svstem that processes data into a
meaningful form that can be used by the recipient for
decision-making purposes. [Ref. 42: p. 512]
Management of the integrated information resources of
corporation, including data processing, communication




The policy, action, or procedure .concerning information
(both automated ana nonautomated) that management estab-
lishes to serve the overall current and future needs of
the organization. IRM policy and procedures would
address such areas as availability, timeliness, accu-
racy, integrity, privacy, security, auditabili ty , owner-
ship^ use, ana cost-effectiveness of information.
[Ref. 441: p. 2-1]
A divergence of opinion is apparent in these defini-
tions. Some authorities say that Information Resource
Management infers automation; others not; some insist that
the management of the data is the key issue. Some say that
the information, next to personnel, is the most iiportant
asset of the organization; others do not; others say that
ISM is no more than a glorified extension of MIS and will
probably go the same route as other information systems and
fail to live up to its claim [Ref. 20: p. 84]. The authors
feel that Information Resource Management is the first real
concept that tries to encompass all of the organization's
attributes in its planning. The organization uses these
resources much like an investor uses an investment
portfolio
—
putting his assets and time into those areas that
will reap the organization the highest yields based on that
organization's present situation and future strategy.
Top management must realize that the computer can help
the organization put their arms around the domain or bounded
area of the activity's area. The external forces and
internal needs should drive the information system, not vice
versa. If symbolic representations in the computer are not
founded in organizational reality, the representations
should probably not be there. Each piece of information
that is stored and manipulated should serve some real organ-
izational need. [Ref. 29: p. 73]
The definition that seems the closest to conveying the
authors' opinion of IRM was formulated at a Workshop on Data
Dictionary Systems and Information Resource Management
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sponsered by the Association for Computing Machinery and the
National Bureau of Standards in 1980. The definition reads:
Information Resource Manaaement is whatever policy,
action, or procedure concerning information (both auto-
mated and nonau tomated) which management establishes
that serve the overall current and future needs of the
enterprise. Such policies, etc. , would include consid-
erations of availability, timeliness, accuracy. integ-
rity, privacy, security, auditabilitv, ownership, use
and cost effectiveness. [Ref. 45: p. 50]
This definition of IRM was said to have been chosen to
emphasize the organization's wide nature of planning and
execution of information policies, actions, and procedures
in order that data can be treated as a true resource. The
definition was also to reflect the primary shift of data
processing uses from processing centered design methodolo-
gies to data centered methodologies [Ref- 46: p. 1-10],
which .is a key point, but will be left to further investiga-
tion by future writers. Additionally, one will observe that
the DOD accepted version reads almost verbatim as this defi-
nition does and the proposed S2CNAV instruction on IEH has
adopted the DOD's terminology [Ref. 47: p. 1, Encl 2].
D. A CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF IBB
A modern organization possesses a tremendous amount of
valuable data that has been generated, collected, and stored
in an automatic and somewhat formatted state as well as
manual files. However, the real information content of an
enterprise consists cf both unformatted data and informa-
tion, as well as both manual and automated processes. Data
can be classified into four distinct classes:
1. Formatted and machine readable.
2. Formatted but not machine readable.
3. Unformatted but machine readable.
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4. Unformatted and not machine readable. [Eef. 46: p.
1-8]
The processes reguired to utilize the data of any of the
above classes include:
1. Collection- This process generally tends to be expen-
sive as the ccst of identification and recording can
be high. [Hef. 18: p. 73]
2. Processing- The data collected is generally massaged
in some fashion before and/or after being stored. In
the case of automated data, this could occur through
the use of computer programs while for nonautoaated
data, manual processes are used. [ Ref • 36: p. 102]
3. Storage- The repository of data and information may
be termed as a database, whether it is a filing
cabinet, a library of books or documents, a set of
computer tapes, or online storage. Generally, unless
it is a database consisting of stacks of letters and
magazines on an officer's desk, there is some organi-
zation to this database. There is a storage method
(such as a catalog or filing system) generating an
index for its retrieval, or perhaps a method of
sorting the database in some predefined order. A
distinction should be made between storage of current
data and archival storage. [Eef. 18: p. 56]
4. Retrieval- The retrieval process normally uses some
knowledge about the storage technique being used
(such as what the index, catalog, or ordering is) to
make sure the time and cost to retrieve it more
effective, if not efficient. Often there exists seme
kind of query interface that a user may invoke to aid
in the retrieval. [Hef. 48: pp. 60-61]
5. Communications- Many times a communications medium
must be invoked if the requester for data is at seme
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site remote from the database or If the database is
distributed. The communications system may consist
of messenger services, mail services, telephone or
other automated systems, some of which may involve
microwave and satellite links. [Ref. 22: pp. 96-101]
The environment in which the preceding processes take
place is composed of:
1. Data and Information- This has been discussed previ-
ously, and represents the heart of the entire spec-
trum of information processing activities.
2. The Users in the Organization- Here the authors are
referring to the personnel in the organization who
are users of data and other information components in
the pursuit of the activities that represent the
purpose of the organization. It can be expected that
this will include the vast majority of the people
working for the organization. [Ref. 4: pp. 95-99]
3. Physical Facilities- This is an extremely broad range
of entities composed of computer hardware, but also
includes microfilm cameras and readers, xerographic
i
copiers, word processing systems, visual and audio
devices, etc. , as well as manual files, typewriters,
etc. [Ref. 18: pp. 496-497]
4. Processing Facilities- The use of these are required
in the processing activity described above, but is
not limited to it. These are all the activities that
take place in the use of physical facilities, i.e.,
what is usually called software and manual processes.
Software should be differentiated between vendor
supplied and produced in house, which may include
software produced with the help of contractual
services or automated tools. [Ref. 48: pp. 89-92]
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5. Support facilities- In this— category, the authors
include all the services which are required by users
of data as well as personnel whose responsibilities
are primarily in the information systems area.
Included are research librarians, local computer
systems staff advisors and system designers, etc.
[Eef. 36: pp. 56-58]
Each component listed is referred to as an Information
Resource, and then Information Resource Management (IRK)
becomes the task of managing these resources in an inte-
grated and coordinated manner. The field of IRK thus
contains all management aspects (policy formulation,
resource allocation, implementation, and control) of the
entire information related operations of the organization.
The many locations in which an organization has previously
stored its database merely adds to a confusing situation
which has grown from a lack of ability to truly manage the
information, as it was too dispersed and to difficult to
control in any centralized fashion. [Ref. 46: p. 1-10] The
relatively recent realization that modern computing systems
can and probably should .be used to control the entire infor-
mation resources of the enterprise has culminated in such
disciplines such as Database Management System (DBMS)
,
Spatial Data Management System (SDMS) , the Data Dictionary
System (DDS) , Decision Support Systems (DSS) , and
Information Resource Dictionary Systems (IRDS) , to name a
few, as well as planned extensions to allow better planning
and control of the entire information resource.
All the foregoing considerations emphasize the growing
awareness that information is a vital organization resource
and that, as such, it must be managed as skillfully as any
other important resource. The importance of managing infor-
mation gathering and processing, was recognized by the
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Association of Systems Management (ASH) , which adopted a
program, called "Project 80 T s. " This project identified
four general classes of information technology: data, text,
voice, and image, which would possibly require management by


























[Ref. 43: p. 18]
Figure 4.4 Convergence of Information Technologies
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systems professionals. Figure 4.4 -illustrates how the data
processing, automated office, and communications disciplines
are merging and creating an overall Information Resource
Management need. [ Ref . 43: p. 19]
As noted in Nolan*s model earlier, as organizations
approach the maturation stage, the contention for informa-
tion resources increases and productivity is emphasized
[Ref. 34: p. 120]. The major tasks of the IS centers will
not be the design of more effective computers or computer
programs. Rather, it will be to improve:
1. The quality of information services as perceived by
the users of such services.
2. The productivity of the end users.
3. The management of data processing systems and appli-
cations efforts. [Ref. 43: p. 22]
Information Resource Management seems, in the opinion of the
authors, to be the discipline, methodology, or thought





- DEFINING IRM FOR NAVAL SHORE ACTIVITIES
A. WHY IRM FOR THE SHORE ACTIVITY?
Op until this point, the authors have presented possible
reasons why IRM is in vogue today. From IS history to a
displaying of the problems confronting the commanding
officer cf a shore command today, the purpose was to provide
reasons and insight to the concept of IRM. Now the authors
will explore how Information Resource Management fits into
the schema of the Naval Shore Activity and in what areas it
might "lighten the load" of the commanding officer and the
principal department heads.
But, caution must be observed here. If the reader
expects to find a neat, clean-cut, twenty-five words or less
definition of IRM at the activity level, they will probably
be very disappointed. The authors feel that IRM is a series
of processes initiated by the activity for the purpose of
utilizing information as a resource that benefits the
command. This gees against the grain of traditional thought
that structures most concepts to the point that their flexi-
bility and creativity are normalized to a position where
they might not be useful, viable tools for the decision
maker. This innate vision of the organization, cannot be
boxed, crated, or priced, but rather requires years of
commitment at all levels of the command, until the concep-
tual framework of IRM becomes the mature, infrastructure
that it purports to be.
B. flEICH INTERPRETATION OF IBM?
One of the immediate problems is to decide on an inter-
pretation of IRM that will produce the desired results.
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Because it is a relatively new - field, there is not a
commonly agreed upon set of terms or definition of scope for
Information Resource Management. This was pointed out quite
clearly in Chapter IV. Presently, there are two somewhat
diverse interpretations of what IBM encompasses. One inter-
pretation holds that 1KB is the management of all of the
resources of an enterprise which are devoted to handling
information. In this regard, the reader could view IBM as
incorporating the management of ADP and word processing
equipment, telecommunications, IS design and development,
software production and maintenance, technical libraries,
document retrieval systems, and much, much more. This view
would focus on the people, equipment, and procedures neces-
sary tc provide information to decision makers in the organ-
ization. [Bef. 49: p. 3]
The authors would contend that the structured and
centralized nature of the Navy results in the above inter-
pretation being held by the commanding officers of most
shore activities. Additionally, this thought process is
easily portrayed graphically, as well as being readily
communicated to the organization. But the authors believe
this view is not the correct way that IBM should be looked
upon by the shore activity.
The second interpretation, and the one that the authors
subscribe to in this thesis, holds that information is a
basic resource of an organization--a resource that must be
managed. Information Resource Management, in this interpre-
tation, is the mana gemen t of in formation as a resour ce and
not ££§ management cf the resource involved in ha ndl in g or
producing information. From this perspective, IRM encom-
passes the management of the names, attributes, values, and
other representational characteristics of the information
which the organization collects, transmits, processes,
stores, or distributes. The management of the information
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resource, naturally, -Hill entail interaction and cooperation
with the management of the information handling resources,
tut Information Resource Management entails a unique set of
problems and provides a command-wide perspective of the
information resource regardless of the storage media of the
data or the system of its application. [Ref. 49: p. 3]
C. DIPIBING THE PR0EIE3
Virtually every action by a commander, manager, or
administrator in the Navy, as in any large organization,
involves the acauisition and understanding of information:
information about the organization, about its status, about
its resources, about its environment. His actions usually
result in the creation and promulgation of policies ana
directives: that is, information for subordinates, peers, or
superiors. [Ref. 2: p. 2]
This quote was taken from a July, 1933, report to the United
States Navy by a Committee to review the Navy's long-range
ADP planning- The report went on to say that automated
handling cf information is a means for facilitating the
whole IRM process: for carrying out simple functions and for
keeping, transferring, and displaying in clear form informa-
tion to be used by people; people who may be workers,
managers, or both- [Ref- 2: p. 2]
Managing information as a resource would appear to be a
concept that would appeal to the commanding officers of most
naval activities. Information can now be understood as a
resource which can be managed by the commanding officer in
ways similar to the manner in which personnel, money, facil-
ities, and supply inventory resources are presently managed.
Although this concept would probably elicit a favorable
response from the commanding officer and the principal
department heads, the question then becomes what is the
procedure (s) for managing this resource? This guestion
should be asked carefully, because the process of resource
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management may not be as well documented or understood as it
is practiced. Many commanding officers are effective in
managing a number of resources, given the goal of accom-
plishing a particular task or mission. The commanding offi-
cer's experience, coupled with intuitive leadership and
managerial skills, enables the commanding officer to carry
out the task. However, asking these same professionals how
they might manage any one specific resource may result in a
not so clear-cut response. [Ref. 50: p. 41] Because of
this, suggesting that information should be managed as a
resource will not invoke the actioned response that equates
to the conceptual connotation that was discussed previously
in this chapter.
The relative unit cost of processing an item of informa-
tion, whether in collection, storage, computational,
distributive, processing or dissemination modes, appears to
be dropping significantly [Ref, 17: p. 3]. This was
discussed earlier, but what must be cautioned here, is that
the commanding officer's attention may be diverted to the
tool--the new equipment— rather than an objective and subs-
tantive review of the information requirements which
supposedly justify the investments involved [Ref. 51: p.
25]. The authors discussed this point with a civilian
member of a naval station staff, who was hired by the
commanding officer to "update" the processing services at
his command. The CC's direction to the system's analyst
consisted entirely of the statement, "Bring us out of the
dark ages," with little other specific direction as to what
the final system should look like or encompass! Such a
statement will probably result in a proliferation of very
useful tools and ideas, but overall may not necessarily be
synchronized and harmonized within the organization's
mission, policies, and operating frameworks [Ref. 17: p. 8].
Thus, the management of information as a resource should
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focus on the management of information regardless of its
storage medium, irrespective of the equipment (data
processing, office automation, data communications, etc.)
which handles it, and looks both horizontally and vertically
across systems, uses, organizational boundaries, and func-
tional areas [Hef. 31: p. 2].
Webster's New World Dictionary provides the following
three definitions:
1. Information-knowledge acquired in any manner;
facts; data; learning; lore.
2. Resource-something that lies readv for use or
that can be drawn upcn for aid or to take care of
a need.
3. Management- the act, art or manner of managing, or
handling, controlling, directing, etc. [fief. 52:
pp. 723; 1211, 859] L
These definitions seen neat and tidy, but to the commanding
officer who is attempting to implement IRM, they become
anything but "user friendly." But this should not be so.
Managing data and information resources certainly isn't seme
startling new breakthrough or patentable invention that the
world has been holding its breath in anticipation of
receiving. Rather, it should be emphasized that IRM is
simply an updating and integration of related information
management principles currently dispersed and diffused among
many different disciplines and bodies of knowledge [Ref. 17:
p. 3]. While IRM makes the case that data and information
resources have been under-managed and under-utilized, it
woul d be a mistake to adopt the view that IRM will solve all
of the commanding of ficers resource management and uti liza-
tion problems [Ref. 20: p. 84]. Rather, it should be viewed
as one of many tools that should ease the burden or increase
the efficiencies of the decision making process.
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D. VIEWS OF INFORMATION
1 • Broad Views of Information
The authors brought forth two broad views of the way
information should be viewed by the commanding officer of a
shore activity in Chapter III. One was an external view of
that information which the commanding officer utilized to
satisfy the demands /reports of the administrative chain of
command. The other informational view, consisted of those
data inferences that were required in the day-to-day opera-
tion of the activity. But, both of these views are not
specific enough to the discussion of information, to bring
to proper view what information as a resource should appear
as to the commanding officer. Something more is required.
One of the most significant management problems to
be faced in the management of information will be the deter-
mination of the cost of information within an organization
and the benefit that is received by introducing a wide
variety of information handling techniques. Daniel
Schneider, a speaker at the INFOSYSTEMS IBM conference in
1980, suggested that the value added concept of information
can be understood by categorizing information into different
categories
:
1. Information for operation,
2. Information which enhances operation, and
3. Information for decision making [Ref. 50: p. 42].
To encompass the points given, the authors contend that the
commanding officer must begin thinking of data, not just as
abstractions —ideas—but as something tangible, physical,
and concrete. Granted, information could be thought of in
two ways: as abstractions (ideas) and as a physical
commodity. But in the end, the commanding officer must
consider both ways of looking at information if the shore
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activity is to manage the information effectively. This
will require a fundamental rethinking of traditional ways of
looking at information.
James Martin further identifies these sane three
categories as types of management, i.e., operating manage-
ment, innovative management, and top management [Ref. 28: p.
173]. While the first and last are easily identifiable at
the shore activity, the innovative management idea does not
lend itself as well. The authors would prefer that the term
"planning" te substituted for the term "innovative." Each
of the three managements have different information needs:
1. Operating Management Information Needs - Existing
procedures in the organization are primarily these
which have been established by directives from higher
authority, as well as command and departmental
instruction, that enables them to carry out their
day-to-day activities and responsibilities.
Reporting procedures provide the data and information
necessary for routine decision making by operating
management.
2. Planning Management Information Needs - While oper-
ating management is concerned with today, planning
management is concerned with tomorrow: the priori-
ties, services and activities which the organization
will address in the future. The information required
by planning management is forward-looking, rather
than the typical backward looking or current informa-
tion required by operating management.
3. Top Management Information Needs - Top management
requires information both for today and for tomorrow.
The organizational leaders require information about
today's activities (from operating management). But
top management also requires information which will
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enable them to establish the direction of the future.
Planning management normally provides this latter
input to top management. [Ref. 28: p. 173]
2 « Ihe Lifecycle of Information
Essential in the implementation of Information
Resource Management, is a clear understanding of the rela-
tionships between knowledge, information, and data. A
STAGE J " Maturation when new uaea end
application! neve been t»-
hauated and lta uea aa infor-
mation fully reellted
Stage 1
StAgE 2 " Growth through eollec-
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STAGE <> ' Decline.
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entual "death" when




Figure 5*1 Life Cycle of a Fact.
simple schematic, as shown in Figure 5.1, can perhaps most
easily be understood as depicting the "life cycle of a
fact." Thus, in the first stage of its life cycle, a fact
is "born" or emerges* At this stage, it is a raw fact —
unevaluated* It has almost no significance standing alone
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out of context. As the fact "grows," it enters the second
stage of its life cycle. Someone has chosen to evaluate the
significance of the fact, to place some interpretation and
meaning on it. Thus information is sometimes referred to as
evaluated data. Finally, in the third stage, the maturation
stage, various bits and pieces of information are put
together in an even broader context. Knowledge then will
aid the user to move from the mere option or half-truth to
"truth." Eventually, the fact "dies" or its identity and
relevance are completely subsumed and submerged in the
knowledge base. [Ref. 36: p. 53]
3 • Zi2§.t Is Information ?
Forest W. Horton, Jr. , has compiled many theorists'
ideas in addition to his own, in how one might view
information.
1. All acquired facts were at one time information,
beginning with the early prenatal and postnatal
processes of sentience, cognition, recoqnition,
and perception.
2. Knowledge is an organized body of information, or
the comprehension and understanding consequent to
the acauisition thereof. Information is there-
fore tEe narrower term of the two.
3. Two or more facts may be correlated by the intel-
lect to produce information. Both facts may
already be in memory, or one may be in memory and
the other in the process of being brought" into
memory.
4. Semantically and epistemologically , insofar as
this hypothesis is concerned, because of some
dialectic such as induction or deduction.
5. The value of information is the extent to which
it helps to resolve uncertainty. The value of
information is zero if uncertainty is not
resolved to any degree; "complete" if uncertainty
is completely resolved.
6. In this theoretical framework, the burden imposed
on those persons who furnish information might be
defined, measured, or weighed against the value
of the information furnished in psychological
value/burden terms only, not in economic terms.
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7. One man's data may be another man's information
and vice versa.
8. Typicallv, as we go up the organizational/
authority ladder, information at the lower level
becomes data at the unper level. Part of the
reason is summarization and aggregation of data
to correspond to broader responsibilities. Part
of the reason goes to interpretation differences,
because significance and relevance are, in part,
circumstantial and contextually-de? ancient , not
rooted in absolute or immutable conditions or
situations. [ Ref . 36: p. 55]
A popular distinction among current writers
restricts the label of information to evaluated data
[Ref. 31: p. 2-1]. Other authors feel that it is net so
much a problem of data acquisition as of data organization;
not so much of organization as of retrieval; not so much of
retrieval as of proper choice; not so much of proper choice
as of identification of wants; not so much of identification
of wants as of identification of needs. The problem then in
information management, is not one of gathering, organizing,
storing, or retrieving data, but rather one of determining
the necessary information requirements for decision making.
[Ref. 22: p. 194]
Information is simply symbols (data. text, images,
voice, etc.) that convey meaning through their relative
ordering, timing, shape, context, etc. it includes all of
the traditional output associated with computerized informa-
tion systems such as computer printouts, display screens,
microfiche and data bases. It also includes memos (wcrd
processed or not) , conversations (hallway or coast-to-
coast) , drawings (scribbled or draftsperson drawn) and body
language. Information is the raw material for making deci-
sions, for creating knowledge and for freeing the modern
organizaticn. [Ref. 38: p. 43]
The views of information are limitless and complex. But out
of possible chaos comes order, as the authors will try to
convey in the next few sections of this chapter.
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E. STAGES OF IRM
As the authors have presented in previous chapters,
Richard Nolan has benefited the information systems commu-
nity through his studies and writings in the Ha rvar d
lH§iH£SS Review about his proposed stage theories of evolu-
tion of information systems organizations. The stage theory
concept is now being applied widely in many areas of the
technological explosion [Ref. 30: p. 466]. The authors feel
that it would be equally appropriate to apply the stage
theory to understanding the evolution of IRK within a
particular activity or organization. The stage theory would
indicate that organizations will go through four significant
stages of IRM evolution:
1. Initiation,
2. Contagion and proliferation,
3. Consolidation and control, and
4. Experienced maturity [Ref. 50: pp. 47-48].
A key factor of understanding the stage theory is that
the organization will learn only through experience in the
use of a new concept. It will be necessary for the organi-
zation to move step-by-step along the learning curve through
the various different stages. [Ref. 53: p. 88] An IRM
program must keep pace in concept with the learning stage
the organization has achieved in computer growth [Ref. 50:
p. 48]. As the authors pointed out in earlier chapters, the
possibility that the O.S. Navy is presently in stage 2 or 3
of Nolan's 6 stages (see Figure 4.1) of computer growth
within an organization, probably works in favor of the
command that is trying to implement IRM along with automated
facilities. Remembering that IRM is a series of processes
or a vision of how information should be dealt with within
the organization, will allow the activity to reach
70

maturation goals in both computer usage and the IEH infras-
tructure simultaneously. The inherent advantages of this
approach is obvious in that neither the usage of computers
nor the thought process of IE3 are considered as "add-on",
but rather both have become viable, integrated parts of the
activity as both have grown and matured side by side in the
organization.
It is not possible for an organization to jump along the
learning stage diagram, bypassing important learning experi-
ences [Eef. 50: p. 48]. To do so, would be to invite
disaster in the form of the system becoming a detriment to
the functioning of the organization rather than an effective
aid to information management. It can be possible however,
for the organization to move rapidly along the learning
curve and to move without as much stress and strain as might
otherwise be incurred, if an appropriately structured IRM
program did not exist. Information Resource Management
advocates, department heads, and the commanding officer,
will probably change their views of IRM at different times
along the learning curve. Advocates will learn faster and
they must have patience until the rest of the organization
moves effectively along the curve. This may mean that
equipment proliferation and the use of diverse technologies
may be necessary prerequisites to the introduction of
control procedures, that will introduce into the organiza-
tion an effective Information Resource Management program.
[Ref. 4: pp: 7-14]
F. METHODOLOGY FOR I3PLEMENTI0N OF IRS
To this point, the authors have presented various argu-
ments for why a shore activity should attempt to implement
IRM. The obstacles that would interfere with such an imple-
mentation seems endless; the task itself formidable. Many
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opponents to such an implementation might offer the argument
that the present way cf doing business at the shore activity
seems to work well enough. The authors would counter with
the following excerpt from the Mission Elements Needs
Statement (HENS) submitted by the Commanding Officer, Naval
Station, Norfolk. This MEN'S stated that maintaining the
status quo and failing to incorporate modern technology will
only:
1. Promote and perpetuate obsolete manual methods of
processing management information.
2. Delay important decisions for want of current
data an d a ready retrieval of pertinent data.
\
3. Use up personnel resources to maintain manual
processes which are inefficient.
4. The effective management of resources will
continue to te impaired.
5. Reduce the prime management functions of planning
and training to subordinate priorities.
[Ref. 3: p. 4]
This seems all well and good, but how does the
commanding officer implement an IRM infrastructure as
described so far at the activity? The authors propose to
give a brief introduction to a methodology in this section,
with a more detailed, step by step, "cookbook" approach to
be provided in Chapter VII. The "cookbook" approach will be
structured so that it can be utilized by the shore activi-
ty's commanding officer and his subordinates. The authors
will utilize the bcok Inf ormation Engineering by James
Martin and Clive Finkelstein as the methodology and the
"Bases and Stations Architecture", as briefed to OP-094 in
mid-1984, as examples in formalizing an approach to IRM
implemention for a shore activity.
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G. BASES AND STATIONS ARCHITECTURE—
In April 1984, CP-0945 commenced formal procedures to
implement a systems architecture at selected Naval Stations
and Eases, both CONDS and abroad. The authors met with
Captain K. Laughton , USN, initial project manager of the
proposed architecture, in mid-May 1984. The various
approaches and methodologies were discussed that were being
considered in implementing an IS architecture to be utilized
by the activity's comanding officers and subordinates.
Since the Bases and Station's Architecture is projected
to have a major impact on the shore activity, it is vital
that the reader have an overview of the Architecture's
history and direction. The proposed architecture will be a
process, not necessarily a structured approach. Along that
line, the core group, see Table III for the make-up of the
group, determined various measures of effectiveness (MOE's)
for the architecture, as well as making various recommenda-
tions of how to accomplish the process based on the present
picture of things and the requirements as addressed by
various commanding officers of shore activities. Included
in this proposal was "bounding" the project to include 102
bases/stations total, identifying the functional areas at
each activity to be implemented that would be included in
the architecture (from a previous list of 55) , proposing the
implementation of 8 packages per year with the completion of
the project projected for 1990, and determining 3 prototype
activities (Naval Stations in Norfolk, Mayport, and San
Diego were selected with three Naval Air Stations at the
time of this writing yet to be decided upon) .
To aid activities in the interim, until the projects
were fully implemented, standard buy, stand alone, microcom-
puter systems (Zenith 100's) were recommended for use by all




Bases and Stations Architecture Core Group
Chairman: Cart Richardson, OP-0945
NAVDAC Tech Dir: Mr. Singleton, OP-094
CINCFACFLT: Capt McHillian (ADF advisor)
CINCLANTFLT: Capt Ramsey (ADP advisor)
NAVSTA Norfolk: Capt Moore
Project Manager: Capt Laughton, OP-0945
A number of additional people were invited
for various portions of the discussion.
[Bef. 54]
for most activities and could be purchased using CSM, N
funds. Additionally, NAVDAC has implemented steps to ensure
that the nine NARDAC's break away from the "mainframe"
mentality and try to size hardware to software requirements,
in support of naval ' activity commanding officers. [Ref. 54]
In mid-July 1984, the Bases and Stations Architecture
was briefed to OP-094, VADM Nagler. With few exceptions the
project was approved as briefed, thus laying the ground
rules for an architecture that is entirely "fleet" driven
rather than the "top-down" approach as most projects are
envisioned. The scope of the project covers the before
mentioned 102 activities, plus 7 sponsors and 8 major
claimants—a monumental task to say the least. [Ref. 11:
unmarked] Figure 5.2 depicts a graphical representation of
how the functional areas of the activity might interface
with the commanding officer as well as the internal and
external requirements that top management must deal with.
The term architecture in the computer industry, often
implies a scheme which has not yet been fully implemented.
A good architecture should relate primarily to the needs of
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the end user rather than to the enthusiast for particular
techniques. [Eef. 48: p. 413] Fred Brooks has defined
architecture in a viay which makes a clear distinction
between architecture and engineering:
Computer architecture, like ether architecture, is the
art of determining the needs of the user of a structure
and then designing to meet those needs as effectively as
possible within economic and technological constraints.
Architecture must include engineering considerations, so
that the design will be economical and feasible: but the
emphasis in architecture is upon the needs of the user,
whereas in engineering the emphasis is upon the needs of
the fabricator. [Eef. 55: p. 45]
Additionally, architecture must be carefully distinguished
from implementation. G.A. Blaauw states, " T-7here architec-
ture tells wha t happens, an implementation tells how it is
made to happen" [Ref. 56: p. 76]. Architecture, engi-
neering, implementation; words that the commanding officer
must understand if IBM is to aid the activity in their usage
of information.
H. INFORMATION ENGINEERING: AN OVERVIEW
1 • What is Info rmation Engineering?
The term Information Engineering refers to the set
of inter-related disciplines which are needed to build a
computerized enterprise based on today's data systems. This
is in contrast to Software Engineering which is the set of
disciplines used only for specifying, designing and program-
ming computer software. The primary focus of the
Information Engineering methodology is the data that is
stored and maintained by computers or the sources, and the
information that is distilled from this data. A basic
premise therefore (and one that must be understood by the
reader or implementer of IRM) is that data lies at the
























Figure 5-3 Data at the Center of Data Processing.
The data is stored and maintained with the aid of
various types of data systems software. The processes on
the left create information with appropriate accuracy
controls, and will be updated periodically. The processes on
the right use the data. Routine documents such as 1119's,
receipts, PMS results, etc. , are printed upon demand. The
commanding officer or principal department heads sometimes
search for information as required. They create summaries
or analyses of the data, and produce charts and reports.
They ask "What if?" guestions and use the data to help them
make decisions. Auditors check the data and attempt to
ensure that it is not misused. The data in Figure 5.3 may
be in multiple data systems; the data may be stored in
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different ways; it may be distributed; the data is often
updated and used by means of transmissions links and
terminals. [Ref. 57: pp. 3-4]
2. Data is Stable, Procedures are Not
A second basic premise of Information Engineering
is that the types of data used in an organization dc not
change very much. The things about which data is stored
—
for example, personnel, equipment, supply inventories, plant
property— do not change over the lifetime of the activity
except for the occasional (rare!) addition of new types.
The characteristics of these types of things—the fact that
they have names, sizes, shapes, durations— also rarely
change. However, the individual things
—
particular
personnel or supply inventory—do change, so the values of
the data kept change constantly like the data in a flight
information board at an airport. The important point is
that although values change, the structures of the data does
not change much if it was initially well designed. This
structure therefore cculd be used as the foundation for the
organization's information systems. [Ref. 28: p. 4]
The foundation is secure only if the data is
correctly identified and structured so that it can be used
with the necessary flexibility. This is not a simple task
and many of the early attempts to build organizational
information systems failed. Some are now succeeding where
appropriate methodologies are used. Because the basic data
types are stable while procedures tend to change, data-
oriented forms of structured techniques succeed, if
correctly applied, where procedure-oriented techniques have
resulted in systems which are slow to implement and diffi-
cult to change. Information Engineering seeks to fulfill,
rapidly, the organizations changing needs for information.
The organization can obtain results quickly once the
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necessary data infrastructure is established. The activity
can also have systems which are easy to change if the
Information Engineering techniques have been followed.
[Ref. 57: p. 4
]
3 . The Building Elocks of Infor ma tion Engineering




























[Ref. 28: p. 6]
Figure 5.*» The Basic Building Blocks
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provides in concept, an integrated - set of building blocks.
In this figure, each block is dependent upon the one beneath
it. However, the blocks can be assembled in different ways
depending on the techniques, tools, and style of the organi-
zation adapted by the activity in practice.
1. The stone on which all others rest is Strategic
Require ments Planning. This attempts tD determine
the objectives of the organization and what informa-
tion is needed to enable the activity to accomplish
its objectives. The structure cf Figure 5. 4 can be
built without Strategic Requirements Planning, but to
do so would be like erecting a building en soft
ground without good foundations.
2. The next stage or block is Information Analysis.
This is top-down analysis of the types of data that
must be kept and how the data might relate to each
other. Information Analysis is done across the
entire organization; sometimes this stage is done for
one functional area, department, division or some
ether portion of the activity.
3. The third stage is Data £odelin£. Information anal-
ysis surveys the types of data needed across the
organization. It creates an information model which
is a broad overview but which does not contain all
the details needed for database implementation. Data
modeling creates the detailed logical database design
and attempts to make it as stable as possible before
it is implemented. Stage 3 is an extension of stage
2 which carries it into more detail and applies
various checks for stability. [Ref. 28: p. 5]
Data modeling is sometimes done without organiza-
tional wide data analysis. Localized models are built which
relate to the particular division or department. Localized
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models are easier to create and use- 7 because arguments may
te avoided among the various departments or divisions (func-
tional areas). An objective of Information Engineering,
however, is to achieve agreement on data definitions and
structures across an organization, at least where that data
has tc be shared (to reduce data redundancy) or used in an
overall control system. [Ref. 57: p. 6]
Information analysis cannot be achieved without
senior nanagement support, and that is often lacking.
However, to build and implement a fully integrated IRJJ
infrastructure within the organization, it is vital to
harness the perspectives of top management and put the
bottom two blocks of Figure 5.4 in place. [Ref. 28: p. 7]
The techniques of Information Engineering give top manage-
ment a plan of action with which to direct the development
of information resources [Ref. 57: p. 6].
The bottom three blocks of Figure 5.4 form a foun-
dation on which most future data processing will be built.
Once it, or part of it, exists it may become desirable that
computer procedures te developed to create and use the data.
[Ref. 57: p. 7] Note, that up to this point, no mention has
been made about automated systems whatsoever—the inference
is clear: defi ne y our objectives and what business y_ou are
<y_°u£ wd.th clear definitions of the data and inform atio n
J^nuire 1 at all lev els w it hin t he organization
, 2LL9L £o
^ven considering what sort of con^uter or automated e quip-
ment will best serve the organization.
I- IRM REVISITED
IRM is a management function. As such, IRM is a part of
the organization's processes, like supply, administration,
or port services. It is a function requiring management at
a significant level. The purpose of this management
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function is to develop and implement" policies, programs, and
guidelines. These are rather typical functions for a
management organization, but the key to all of this, is
again, it does not sav computerize. Rather, I EM as a
management function, says that the activity shall develop
and implement policies, programs, and guidelines, to plan,
to manage, and control information and information
resources.
The importance here is that the authors do not talk
about the media— e.g., computer, or word processor, or
library, or microfiche— nor do the authors talk about the
use--that is, the level in the organization or focus of the
system top to bottom, decision-making, or operations. Nor
do the authors talk about the source, internal versus
external. What the authors have tried to convey is the need
for a functional area to be responsible for thinking about,
for planning, for implementation of activities that will
maximize the effective use of information in an organiza-
tion. [P.ef. 40: p. 42] Robert Soloman, the director of
communications of Congressional Information Services,
states, "Companies will turn the corner when they realize
the lack of goals to support IBM is costly, time- consuming,
and wasteful. Information can only be measured from the
cost of not having it" [Ref. 58: p. 75].
This is a good point to end the overview of Information
Engineering and IRM for the shore activity. The authors*
purpose was to give the reader a general idea of what is
involved in the thought process required in the implementa-
tion of an automated system for an activity. The reader
should try and visualize the presented thought process as it
relates to Figure 5.2 which showed the basic 17 functions of
the shore activity and their generalized internal and
external interfaces. Chapter VII will follow this thought
process more closely and at a greater depth, while the
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following section of this chapter, shows in general how the
Supply function of an activity would be viewed, utilizing
Information Engineering principles as a guide.
J. SUPPLY DEPARTMENT FUNCTIONAL AREA REVIEW
1 . Introd uction
The strategic requirements planning stage requires
identification of the key information that is supplied by
each functional area. This information is essential for the
effective management of the activity and the accomplishment
of the activity's mission.
The process for developing the key information in
each area can be best illustrated by analyzing a functional
area. The authors will discuss a supply department in order
that the reader may visualize the process for developing the
key information flows, the importance of this information to
the strategic requirements planning stage, and the relation-
ship to the information analysis stage.
The authors chose the supply department because of
its importance to a commanding officer and because of the
fact that it provides some degree of service to most depart-
ments or offices at a naval station. The Naval Regional
Data Automation Center (NAEDAC) Norfolk, analyzed the
various functional areas at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia,
(NAVSTA NORVA) , and documented the fact that the supply
department interfaced with each of the other functional
areas [Ref. 59: p. 135]- The importance of the supply
department was demonstrated by the findings of the Bases and
Stations Architecture review. A survey of all participating
commanding officers ranked the supply function as the second
most critical of the seventeen functional areas to be imple-
mented in the future [Ref. 11: unmarked].
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The authors recognized that every supply department
will he tailored tc support the specific mission of the
parent activity and that a typical supply department dees
not exist. The authors' choice of NAVSTA NOEVA's Supply
Department as an example was based upon a number of factors.
NAVSTA NOEVA was chosen because it represents one of the
Navy's major shore installations and because it was included
in the original Bases and Stations surveys. Additionally,
the NAREAC-NORFOLK report documented the operation of the
supply department and the areas most likely to be candidates
for automation. A final justification for considering
NAVSTA NCRVA's Supply Department is the fact that the Naval
Automated Data Command (NAV.DAC) reviewed and adapted NAVSTA
NORVA's Mission Element Need Statement (MENS) as a model and
designated NAVSTA NOEVA as a prototype site for developing a
"Naval Ease Information System" [Ref. 11: unmarked].
2 • The Supply Department
The mission of the Supply Department can be stated
as:
....to provide supply services to all departments and
offices of the Naval Station and limited supcly sucport
to shore activities and forces afloat [Ref. 60: Chart 9]
In order to accomplish this mission the Supply Department is
separated into three divisions: Supply Services Division,
Food Service Division, and. Collateral Equipment Division.
Figure 5.5 illustrates the organizational relationship of
these divisions. Each division will be discussed in the
following paragraphs.
a. The Supply Services Division
The Supply Services division is responsible for

















Figure 5-5 The Supply Department.
equipment for all departments. In addition, this division
maintains the plant property records for Class 3 and 4
equipment and minor plant property. The Supply Services
division is the "heart and soul" of the department and is
responsible for those activities most commonly associated
with the supply department. In addition, the division is
further subdivided into three branches: Procurement,
Receiving and Service Craft.
The Procurement branch is primarily responsible
for the processing of requisitions for material and
supplies, the submission of all invoices for payment, and
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the maintenance of all plant property records. The procure-
ment process is characterized by the fact that requisitions
may be filled by a number of methods. Each of these methods
is constrained by various regulations concerning the type of
material that may be procured and the circumstances under




The Navy supply system,
2. Open purchase from local suppliers,
3. Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) with local
suppliers, and
4. GSA contracts.
The Service Craft branch is organized to support
the pert services department. The primary responsibility
of this branch is the supply management of repair parts and
supplies for the various service craft assigned to the port
services department. These service craft include tugs, yard
oilers and harbor craft, and provide a vital service to the
ships operating in and around the Hampton Eoads area.
The Receiving branch is responsible for the
receipt, issue and storage of items that the supply depart-
ment stocks for all departments of the Naval Station.
Cleaning gear and light bulbs are the major types of
material stocked by the receiving branch. In addition, the
receiving branch is responsible for storing and shipping
seabags belonging to military personnel in an incapacitated,
unauthorized absence or brig status. The maximum length of
storage is 180 days; after which a bag is shipped to another




b. The Food Service Division
The Food Service division is responsible for the
operation and management of the Naval Station's Enlisted
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Lining Facility and 18 satellite 3 facilities. This involves
the issue, sale and transfer of food items; this results in
the sale of an average of 45,000 meals* per month. The
operation of the division is divided into three areas:
1. Records and Eeturns--responsible for the determina-
tion of requirements, processing of all receipts and
expenditure documents and the preparation of records
and returns.
2. Food Storage--responsible for receipt, storage and
issue of all food stocks.
3. Food Preparation— responsible for the preparation and
service of all food products. [Ref. 59: p. 85]
c. Collateral Equipment
The Collateral Equipment Division is responsible
for controlling the Naval Station's reutilizat ion program.
As a divisional entity, it acquires, stores, and issues
excess material that may be utilized by naval station
departments and offices. The division is responsible for
maintaining accounta tility over all equipment and for effec-
tively distributing this material to eligible users.
K. IN SUHMARY
The verbal description of a "typical" naval shore activ-
ities, the supply department just presented, might leave the
reader with the feeling of "so what?" The authors 1 inten-
tion was to ensure that the reader understood the importance
of identifying the mission of the supply department and the
3 These include small galleys on the tugs. a galley at
the degaussing station and a mobile van that services the
fire fighting school.
A Cbtained during 31 August 1984 phone




organization of this functional area." Each of the divisions
and tranches in turn, must be analyzed in order to determine
how it contributes to the department's mission. This anal-
ysis is an ongoing process. After the verbal description is
considered satisfactory, then it is transformed into
diagrams that depict the information/data flows betweer the
various components that will make up the functional area.
These data flow diagrams after approval, may be mapped to
automated systems, depending on the needs and desires of the
activity. The key point is that the 1KB process involves
much thought and discussion by the key personnel of the
activity, prior to reaching fruition into a system that will
meet the current and future needs of the command.
Wetster defines process as "a continuing development
involving many changes" [Ref. 52: p. 1133]. This is what
encompasses IRM. A flexible, mature information system is
constructed, utilizing the tools or building blocks of
Information Engineering or seme other similar methodology,
to develop the required infrastructure that will serve the
commanding officer acd the activity. It is vital that each
functional area go through the same thought process and then
all of the functional areas be brought together and the
activity viewed as a complete entity, prior to automation
integration strategies commencing. In the authors' opinion,
to do otherwise would be to develop a system that will fall
short of fulfilling the mission of the organization, as well
as the requirements of its users. Chapter VII looks closer
at the step-by-step thought process behind the implementa-
tion of IBM, up to the automation stages. The chapter imme-
diately following, investigates the apparent need in the




VI. THE IBH PROFESSIONAL
A. THE TASKIHG
The following quote was taken from a July 193 3, report
to the United States Navy by a Committee to review the
Navy's long-term ADP planning:
I
Ensure that the Navy continues to provide and expands
its ability to provide... a corps of experts to which
units of the Navy can turn for assistance in planning
for and using ADP technology [Ref. 2: p. 23].
The inference seems clear; the tasking pointed. But, pres-
ently, in the authors' opinion, there is no person or organ-
ization within the Navy structure that the commanding
officer can turn to that has the expertise in implementing
the Eases and Stations Architecture or planning the integra-
tion cf IEM within the activity. The activities need help
—
specialized help, that will provide the expertise and skills
required to ensure that viable, structured systems are the
results cf the commanding officer's efforts. Help in the
structuring of systems that will aid in the decision making
processes as well as increase individual productivity at all
levels throughout the command.
The impact of automation and computers on all areas of
management would be even greater today, if one could exploit
the full potential of existing computer technology.
Resistance to change in general and to "computers" specifi-
cally, cause some cf the problems, but the failure to
maximize computer potential is due primarily to lack of
know-how. [Eef. 18: p. 557] The commanding officer is in a
quandary. The broader issues of information management in
support of Navy-wide management and command-decision
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processes is not present at NAVDAC" or the seven NAREAC's
[Bef. 2: p. 16]. But with the issuance of the proposed
Navy's instruction on Information Systems, the commanding
officer is to "organize and integrate information management
functions to accomplish mission goals 1 ' [Ref. 47: p. 3].
There is no one proper approach to information manage-
ment, and the requirements that an information manager must
possess. But the bottom line is that the implementation of
information resource systems at the activity level will
require a new approach and a change in the thinking of
senior personnel. The new information professional mast be
able to grasp the essential motives and goals of the organi-
zation and then structure today's technology to execute
those desires [Ref. 21: p. 16].
In the past, officers in the U.S. Navy have routinely
been placed in positions of authority where they lacked the
technical expertise in their job, but operated successfully
in their new environment by employing good, fundamental
managerial and leadership traits. However, the commanding
officer of most shore activities normally does not possess
the technical expertise in the area of information systems,
nor does the commanding officer have personnel on the staff
who maintain the appropriate skills. The question that the
commanding officer at the shore activity is faced with is,
which person do I put in charge?
In the corporate world, technical knowledge is still
important, but employers are increasingly mentioning such
management attributes as creativity, decision-making, and
communication skills [Ref. 61: p. 8]. In the authors'
opinion, this sounds much the same as the requirements of a
good division officer or department head. But additionally,
"Corporations are interested in cost efficiency. They want
sharp individuals whc are well-rounded, who understand all
the components of the corporation and who are able to make
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decisions on that basis" [Ref. 61 ---: p. 8], This automati-
cally leaves out the Ensign that is 6 months TAD to the base
awaiting orders or the LTJG who is over-allowanced and has
no previous experience of handling people or material.
Additionally, to place the title of Information Systems
Manager (ISK) on an already over-burdened department head or
executive officer as a collateral duty, may possibly doom an
information systems project to failure even before it has
begun. Help is needed.
B. BHERE HELP CAH BE FOUND
Due to the unavailability of help within the Navy envi-
ronment and the lack of expertise within the activity's
organization, more and more commanding officers are turning
to outside sources to supply consulting and information
systems packages. These are expensive, usually short-term
contracts, and do nothing to build a baseline of "experts"
within the Navy to alleviate the anticipated greater need of
information specialists over the next 2 to 5 years.
NARDAC's focus their attention on the largest users and in
the absence of NAREAC's, many users have to adopt less
effective and less uniform ADP systems [Ref. 2: p. 17].
Additionally,
NAVEAC (and indeed all aspects of the Navy and
government/congressional procurement/oversight process)
appears to have been too rigidly focused on computer
The axiom "a good manager can manage anything," could
also te paraphrased to a good division officer or a good
department head. But the one key ingredient that is missing
from this formula, is that normally the inexperienced
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officer had an experienced chief petty officer or first
class petty officer, who could be relied upon in guiding the
new officer over the rough spots. As information systems
managers or implementors of automated information systems
for the shore activity, personnel that have experience in
the areas of computing, ADP, or the management of such
resources, simply do not exist. In the authors' opinion the
bottom line then stays the same--the commanding officer of
the shore activity must either implement the Bases and
Stations Architecture and integrate IHM for the organization
using inexperienced information systems personnel at the
commanding officer's disposal or pay excessive prices for
civilian expertise. Both options leave no guarantee that
the final product will be the information system that was
originally envisioned by the users.
Various "system" or functional area standard software
procurements have already been produced or are in the
process of being produced, for the shore activities. Figure
6. 1 shows two of the functional areas currently in various
stages of i irplementa tion. Note the use of older "Mainframe"
type hardware— one hopes that compatibility and portability
do not become issues when the software is made available to
the activities. Even with the standardized software pack-
ages in hand, the commanding officer is still faced with the
task of integrating these "standardized" packages on hard-
ware that must he procured through other sources.
Additionally, the activity's. Information System Manager will
have to "tailor" the packages to fit the organization as
well as the hardware environments of the command. Finally,
what future support and documentation will be available for
these "system" packages is unclear. The authors feel these
functional area software packages have all the earmarks of
buying "a pig in a poke" with little or no support provided





































































































































Figure 6.1 Typical System Profile.
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C. WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INFORMATION SYSTEMS MANAGER?
The hardest concept of Information Resource Management
(IEM) for today 1 s DP/information processing manager to grasp
is the management process itself.
Although the challenges lining the IEM road appear to
mirror those confronting present-day information processing
management, thev are in reality only mirages. Traditional
management principles take on a new meaning and concept
within the IRM frameviork.
To te successful in this hostile environment, the
so-called "information resources professional" must assume
the role of a ringmaster.
Standing in the "center ring," he or she must te able to
tring the potential chaos of the organization "circus" into
harmonious balance. That is, fuse the other rings of the
organization together to form a cohesive, synergistic infor-
mation resource show. The IRM "ringmaster" must te able to
deal with the clowns, lion tamers and high wire artists of
the organization, while at the same time juggling the
concerns of the DP department. [Ref. 62: p. 17]
Maybe a little over-dramatic, but the inference is guite
clear— the information system managers of the 30 f s and
beyond, must be managers par excellence. The authors feel
that the individuals should report directly to the
commanding officer and have the responsibility for
.
the
information system as well as the authority to make the
required decisions necessary during implementation stages of
the system and beyond.
At a minimum, this individual should:
1. Understand the various functions of the command,
their inter-relationships, and the overall mission
and objectives of the functional areas as well as the
organization.
2. He/she should te able to translate the organizational
objectives into resource requirements and provide
standards to honor them.
3. The information systems manager (ISM) should be able
to plan and control the required resources and stan-




4. It is imperative that the ISM establish visibility or
all known and planned (manual and automated) systems
within the organization with a look toward compati-
bility and future information exchange.
5. The ISM should create a committee of technical and
user representatives from the functional areas, to
evaluate and approve usage without redundancy, using
accepted project management techniques.
6. The area under the ISM's cognizance, should be
staffed with result and people-oriented personnel
that are keenly in tune with the command's goals and
objectives. [Eef. 29: p. 72]
This person should excel in organization, communications,
and the ability to achieve results through people
[Eef. 32 : p. 106]. Academic and/or technical credentials
are essential, but one of little use if the ISM is unable to
fulfill the aforementioned capabilities. The reader must
not be misled by this statement though. The technical and
academic qualifications are extremely • important (a two week
training command environment type school will not suffice in
providing the ISM technician with the tools to successfully
implement a multi-million dollar project for an activity).
But with all the expertise in the world, the technical
manager/iiplementer wculd be unsuccessful if he lacked good
management techniques.
Top management needs to understand what it takes to
manage information; the systems and methods used to communi-
cate and their related resources. Since more than 70
percent of an organization's information is obtained through
manual systems and methods, it behooves senior management to
recognize its significance [Eef. 29: p. 72]. TJhen top
management of the activity or command recognizes and assigns
the proper caliber of talent to lead the critical, sensitive
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area of information management, the entire command will reap
the benefits of the return on investment from the time and
resources utilized.
It would be foolish for an ISM to ignore the complexity
of the organization in which an Information Resource
Management program is being introduced. The political and
social factors within an organization will be more important
in determining the direction of an IRH program than all the
skills of the ISM. In the authors' opinion, the ISM must
try to implement the automated technology and IRM to the
structure of the organization as it exists, and not try to
change the structure cf the organization to fit the system.
The manager should carefully assess the political and social
environment within the organization and develop programs
that will be in concert with the organization's structure,
mission, objectives, and operations, both on a formal and
informal basis [Ref. 50: p. 47]. The future looks complex,
because in an environment in which literally everyone can
have, instant access to information, complex afrangements
will required if the' interests of each group and individual
are to be granted a certain legitimacy through rational
process. [Ref. 63: p. 67] The ISM must act in the face of
uncertainty to grant these desires without the luxury of a
full understanding cf the system or its functions for the
most part.
D. IS AN ISM REALLY REQUIRED?
The reader could argue very convincingly, that a Naval
shore activity could probably do without the services of an
ISM in the implementation of IBM at the command. The growth
in demand for MIS managers and DP personnel, which fell or
at least leveled off during the recent economic recession,
has bounced back with vigor with the recent sustained,
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steady growth of the economy [Ref. 61: p. 1 ]. This would
seem to indicate, in the view of the authors, that corporate
top management does rot truly feel the information system
that they maintain, is the "indispensible" tool that many
HIS managers purport it to be. If required to initiate
corporate cost cutting or "fat trimming", then the MIS
departments are scaled down and systems implementation plans
are held back as first maneuvers of top management to cut
costs. Using the abcve criteria, the authors feel that one
must question the validity of the information system in the
first place.
In the authors' opinion, the reasons for this are many
and varied, some of which include:
1. Information is not viewed as a resource by top
management.
2. It is difficult to quantify or see the tangible
benefits of information, as can be done with produc-
tion, manufacturing, or other functional areas.
.3. Most corporations work, on dollar and cents profit
margins and areas that cannot be viewed in those
terms, are some of the first to be cut when belt
tightening is required.
"Corporations are interested in cost efficiency. They want
sharp individuals who are well-rounded, who understand all
the components of the corporation and who are able to make
decisions on that basis" [Ref. 61: p. 8], states Jaye
Squire, director of sales for 3usiness People, Inc. He goes
on to state that employers are mentioning the attributes of
creativity, decision-making, and communication skills as
prerequisites of their MIS managers. The authors support
this observation, but feel that it is also critical that the




The commanding officer of the shore activity at this
point, may again feel that the requirement for an ISM nay be
waived. Shore activities are not cost centers, but by the
same token, money is not available to be wasted en areas
that will not provide "tangible" benefits. IRH and auto-
mated systems are coming to the Navy in general and to the
shore activities in particular. The commanding officer of
the activity can view the situation much like the commercial
on television that states, "You can pay me now, or you can
pay me later." In the near future, the commands will not
have a choice of whether they implement IBM or not, and will
probably be placed under a time schedule by higher authority
that could be unrealistic in formalizing a viable implemen-
tation at the shore activity. The authors believe that the
IRM process is here tc stay, so the commanding officer that
utilizes the services of an ISM and a structured methodology
for implementation, will enable the command to reap the
future tangible and intangible benefits of such a system not
available tc those commands that wait for specific guidance.
E. DIRECTION FROH HEBE
To successfully iiplement IRH concepts, information
systems executives must be held directiy accountable for
all successes and failures in the information processing
and handling environment, and must be in a position to
freely express different viewpoints and interest with
all levels of management. only one executive level
manager must have the authority to approve all equip-
ment, sorTware, and personnel additions and replacements
to maintain compatibility with the overall organization
environment and preagreed goals. Under these circum-
stances, meaningful significant changes in the informa-
tion processina and handling environment can be made.
[Ref. 23: p. 58]
In the opinion of the authors, the commanding officer of the
Naval shore activity must begin incorporating the ideas and
concepts of IRH for the organization today. Looking objec-
tively and critically at the IRH concepts as previously
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discussed, the activity is likely to" benefit by coordinating
the usually fragmented and uncontrolled information
processing and handling environment expected to fce covered
by the IBM function and the Bases and Stations Architecture.
The degree of success and benefits achieved, will depend
mainly upon the degree of top management's real commitment
and the careful handling of the command's transition through
the IBM stages by the ISM professional. [Ref. 23: p. 58]
As discussed by the authors previously, the commanding
officer has two options available in providing tha organiza-
tion with an ISM professional:
1. Appoint someone that already exists within the
command structure, either military or civilian;
appointed either as a collateral duty or a "full
time" job, or
2. Contract or hire an information specialist from the
civilian sector.
The pros and cons of the choice were presented in earlier
sections of this chapter. Needless to say, the choice is
left to the commanding officer of the activity, for who
knows the command better; its needs, wants, objectives, and
mission. The authors would lean toward the internal choice,
especially in the early stages of the IF.M/architect ure
implementation, with technical expertise sought only after
the problems and direction of the system implementation have
been explored and planned for by top management. The imme-
diate skill needs required by the ISM, would favor an indus-
trious manager, a "politician", and an individual that can
think in a "3ig Picture" or total organizational framework.
Additional skill requirement deficiencies can be allevi-
ated through continuing education. At best, the choice will
be subjective in nature, depending on variables too numerous
to mention. But, the choice must be made if the proposed
system is to be implemented to serve the needs of its users.
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The following section presents factors to be considered
by the command in trying to fill the position of ISM; a "job
description" if you will. These are entirely of the
authors' views on the subject and are open to arguments/
discussion from the reader. The final section of this
chapter delves into the possibility of an officer designator
for an information systems professional for the U.S. Navy.
F. PROPOSED INFORMATION SYSTEMS PROFESSIONAL REQUIREMENTS
In order to successfully implement IRM within the organ-
ization, the information professional must be a management
individual. The information professional should oe assigned
to an organizational identity that is equal to and, capable
of functioning on the same level as the other department
heads. [Ref. 62: p. 17] As the IRM professional, the IS:1
must deal in the same context and "language" as the other
department heads of the organization. The ISM should be
viewed as one of the same, rather than as a person "apart
from the crowd'." [Ref. 20: p. 84] As a professional, the
ISM should fall within the following general definition:
Professional occupations or series are those that
require knowledge in. a field of science or learning
customarily and characteristically acquired through
education and training that meets the requirements for a
bachelor's or higher degree with major studv in or
pertinent to the specialized field, as distinguished
from general education. The work of professional posi-
tions is creative, analytical, evaluative, or interpre-
tive; and is characterized by personal responsibility to
keep abreast of and exercise judgement and bread
perspective in the application of an organized body of
knowledge that is constantly studied to make new discov-
eries and interpretations or to improve the data,
materials and methods. Also included are positions
filled by trainees who meet the basic knowledge require-
ments and who perform work in preparation for fully
professional. [Ref. 64: p. 6]
In addition to the computer technological skills, the
proposed ISM or information professional, should possess the
attributes of a :
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Planner- The very nature of information management
requires that information managers be planners. The
IS manager must aid in the developing organizational
strategies for the future; become the catalysts for
planning at all levels throughout the activity for
the information system.
Change Agent- The very work accomplished by the ISM
dictates that change will take place. Change should
be introduced with care, patience, and sensitivity.
Change may be gradually integrated over time or take
place drastically. The ISM shall dictate the pace of
IBM assimilation throughout the activity.
Infor mation Manager- The ISM must determine how best
to integrate the information function into such areas
as word processing, administration, and telecommuni-
cations. The ISM will serve as consultant, inno-
vator, and "expert" to determine the path of
information throughout the organization.
Proactiyist^ To be responsive to the users' needs
throughout the command will not be enough. The ISM
will have to be aggressive if the information is to
become the heart of the organization. Only through
understanding the technology and applying the same to
the users' desires, will the activity achieve the
best mix of technology to the command's needs.
Busi ness Manager- The tools of information management
and bringing the automated technologies to the users,
can be quite expensive. The ISM will need a solid
understanding of both business and technology to
effectively integrate information management to the
users 1 needs in the most cost effective manner.
Politic ian- Political strategies are an important
part of turning the power structures or organizations
into a positive force for the spread of technology.
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As a good politician, the ISM" can influence users and
top management personnel and lead them through the
maze of technology to the acceptance of information
and systems planning for the organization. The
pclitical side of information management requires
such skills as the ability to recognize power bases
(both formal and informal) ; the development of aware-
ness, sensitivity, and communications skills; and the
interpersonal skills needed to "win friends and
influence people" in the organization.
7 • Integrator- Tie integrating of distributed systems,
of office automation systems, of electronic informa-
tion and service systems, and the management planning
and control systems will require an integrator of the
organization's information resources. The integrator
role will merge microcomputers, communications, and
databases into effective delivery systems that will
bring information resources to managers and staff
throughout the organization, when and where needed.
3- Information Controller- The spread of sophisticated
and expensive technical resources throughout the
organization will require extra care in the manage-
ment of these resources. The result could be more
than just costly and inefficient operations; it could
be loss of control. As information controller, the
ISM will preside over information management, exer-
cising the three C's of control—coordination,
consistency, and compatability--to ensure efficiency
and effectiveness in the use of information resources
distributed throughout the activity.
9- 2trategJ.st^ Management by strategies might provide a
methodology or view for increasing the effectiveness
and the influence of the information management func-
tion in the organization. The ISM must be cognizant
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of the command's overall strategies as well as the
individual strategies of each functional area and
where they complement each other and where they
depart on divergent paths.
10. Staff Professional- The ISM as the information czar
is generally recognized as a "staff" professional in
the organization. As such, the ISM is expected to
provide technical guidance, technological forecasts,
decision support systems, researched-based informa-
tion, and computer-based systems of all kinds in
support of the organization's activities and manage-
ment. If the ISM is to maintain respect and credi-
bility as a staff professional, however, technical
knowledge and education must be continuous.
11. Manager^ In addition to being staff professionals,
ISM's are also just that: managers. They just don't
manage technology. They also manage people, equip-
ment resources, systems projects, user relations,
Management interfaces, budgets and capital expendi-
tures, and technology. The individual who manages
all of these things successfully, especially at a
naval shore activity that encompasses such diverse
functions, is not just a technician; the ISM is a
professional manager— a manager with a technical
specialty, but a professional manager nevertheless.
[Eef. 4: pp. 47-52]
The authors would be quick to point out, that this is not an
all inclusive list of potential qualifications that the
commanding officer should consider, prior to filling the
position of ISM for his activity. The list would probably
change somewhat based on individual problems inherent to
each activity, as well as financial considerations to the
af for dability of such a person, etc. But, the list does
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provide the commanding officer a beginning point on the
traits/skills that the activity's ISM should possess or
possess in the future, as the IfiM infrastructure traverses
toward maturation. These skills are necessary, if the inte-
gration of a methodology to implement TRM is to be
successful for the naval shore activity. With this section
and an instruction fcr writing position descriptions, the
commanding officer should be able to draft the requirements
for an ISP! for the activity. The bottom line is that the
ISM must possess the requisite skills to make the necessary
choices, to build the resultant organization and procedures,
and to motivate and control the organiz at ion to achieve the
£®§i££il objectives [ Ref . 38: p. 16].
G. THE CASE FOB A PROFESSIONAL IS3 OFFICER
The following gucte speaks to the governmental informa-
tion manager' s rise in importance within the government
framework:
If one examines the organizational charts and telephone
directories of major Federal agencies, it is apparent
that the management support cluster of functions is
gradually gaining seme ascendancy. Traditionally these
functions have been stifled by the fourth category--
administration support. Among the "classic" organiza-
tional battles which have taken place are:
1. The change in titles at the top organizational
level from "admist ration" to "management."
2. The shredding out of the ADP function from under
the control of financial managers, to separate
status^ either co-egual to, or unier, or
reporting directly to a generalist manager, such
as a deputy administrator or under secretary.
3. The growth of specialized information centers and
their organizational placement at higher organi-
zational levels.
4. The rise of telecommunications management and its
corresponding high location on the charts, as a
result of the need to manage high speed data
transmission and keep abreast of skyrocketing




5. The gradual erosion of organizational boundaries
between statistical functions and information
functions. In lieu of calling major statistical
capabilities in Government "statistical centers,"
we are seeing names like "data" or "inf oriDa tion
and statistics" center.
6. The ascendancy of the planning and evaluation
staffs and their heavv reliance on data as the
raw material that "feeds" their activities.
7. The emergence of public policy management as a
field of study.
8. The emergence of resources management as a field
of study. [Eef. 36: pp. 248-249]
The reader may infer from the above list, that the one
important, common denominator involved, is that data and
information are the critical resources which each of the
organizational functions requires. Most of the new manage-
ment specialized functions depend on information as the
critical resource. The U.S. Navy, in the authors' opinion,
is no different from the rest of the government areas, in
that information is a critical resource and that these new
organizational functions are forcing the definition of the
role cf the information manager.
In the Committee on Review of Navy Long-Range ADP
Planning report presented to the U.S. Navy in July 1983, the
following statements were obtained:
It is the committee's observation that skilled ADP tech-
nical specialists seem most challenged and exhibit the
greatest dedication when the top management of their
commands understands and appreciates the contribution and
potential of advanced information systems. This is particu-
an ADP billet was likely to be detrimental to an officer's
career. The committee* observed that this policy (whether
consciously established or the result of other decisions) is
es
counterproductive to the objectives of the Navy. Instead o
conserving a scarce manpower resource, the policy ensur ^
that a deficiency of skilled ADP personnel will be perma-
nent. This, in turn, compromises the Navy's ability to
address more fundamental issues, such as uroductivitv
improvements. [ Ref . 2: pp. 18-19]
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The report went on to state that one of the recommendations
of the committee was that the office of ITTAD? should, "Act
as advocate for the establishment of personnel policies and
standards and the development of career £atterns (the
authors highlighting) that enhance the Navy's ability to
acquire, train, and retain competent ADP specialists"
[Ref . 2: p. 21 ].
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VII. IBH IMPLEMENTATION METHODOLOGY
A. INTRODUCTION
Peter Drucker has stated:
We are beginning tc realize that the computer makes no
decisions; it only carries out orders. It's a total
moron, and herein has its strength. It forces us to
think, to set the criteria. The stuoider the tool, the
brighter the master has to be—and this is the dumbest
tool we have. . .It shows us— in fact, it compels us--to
think through what we are doing [ Ref . 18: p. 557],
The impact of computers on the management of most shore
activities has yet to be recognized, and the impact would
increase drastically if the full potential of computer tech-
nology were exploited. In previous chapters, the authors
have discussed hew mest shore activities are experiencing a
proliferation of computers under the general auspices of
"getting out of the dark ages". However, the authors 1
research indicates that few, if an_y, shore activities have
adequately reviewed why they are buying computers, how the
computers will be used, or if the use of the computer will
be cost-effective. The authors would contend that most
shore activities have not "thought through the process of
what they are doing cr why they are doing it."
B. OVERVIEW
Chapter VII is an attempt to provide the top maiagement
of a shore activity a check-off list or "cookbook", that
will enable them to think through the process of imple-
menting IRM. The methodology presented will follow the
basic concepts of James Martin's Information Enginee ring ,
but will be structured to reflect the environment of a Naval
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Shore Activity. Figure 7. 1 illustrates the six steps of
this methodology. Subsequent sections of this chapter will
discuss each of these steps in greater detail.
Additionally, where applicable, examples from the supply
department (discussed in Chapter V) will be provided.
Table VI through Table IX summarizes each of these steps
in an easy to use "bullet" format. The key points are
presented for each stage and additional insight is provided
by comments and/or probing type questions.
C. PROPOSED STEPS OF IRH IMPLEMENTATION
1 . Command Support Deve lo pment (Step J,)
Command Support Development is an attempt by the
commanding officer tc develop a command wide interest in
Information Resource Management and to motivate the depart-
ment heads to support the implementation process. The
commanding officer must convey a .philosophy on IP.3, define
specific policies for implementing IRM, and establish a
clear understanding of the goals.
This is no easy task aod the reader may feel that an
undertaking of this iragnitude is b'eyond the call of duty for
a commanding officer. After all, the commanding officer
probably has little knowledge in this area and more impor-
tantly, the job of being commanding officer of a shore
activity already requires 25 hours every day, let alone
adding another project. The authors do not discount this
viewpoint; however, the commanding officer must recognize
that direct involvement is the single most critical factor
in implementing IRM, and without the personal commitment of
the CO, the entire project will lose visibility and never















Figure 7,1 Proposed Steps for IRH Implementation.
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The authors recognize that- a commanding officer
cannot devote a major part of every day to implementing IRM.
Therefore, it is crucial that the CO appoints someone tc
coordinate this project. The commanding officer must still
take an active part ir the entire project, but ti is "infor-
mation system manager" must be given the responsibility of
overseeing the project and the status and "horsepower" to
effectively function in this postion. Chapter VI discusses
the role of this individual and the qualifications necessary
for this job. The authors recognize that few, if any,
commands will have an individual who is educated and trained
to fill this postion. However, the authors' intent in
discussing this point is to emphasize that until qualified
people are available, it is imperative that the positicn be
filled by the most competent person available.
Since an Information System Manager (ISM) will be
required to wear many hats, it is imperative that the job be
assigned to an experienced and knowledgeable person who is
capable of dealing with all levels of management. The
authors perceive that in most activities this will channel
the assignment to either the executive officer or to one of
the department heads. However, rarely will these individ-
uals have sufficient time to devote to implementing a
project cf this magnitude. ?ho then is to be assigned this
job? The authors feel that there is no specific answer to
this question. Rather, each activity will have to evaluate
its organization and attempt to identify the most capable
individual who can devote a sufficient amount of time to
this project. Ideally, it would be desireabie to hire a
qualified individual and assign this individual to the
commanding officer's principal staf f , , but the cost, as well




An activity's education "plan is the key to
developing support throughout the command. However, the
commanding officer must gain an understanding of IRK before
this plan can he undertaken. At the same time, the depart-
ment heads must also be exposed to the principals of IEM.
The authors offer this thesis as a source of information for
providing a basic understanding of the principles of IBM and
the process for implementing such a system. In addition,
the bibliography provides an excellent source of current
articles on the subject of IRK. Regardless of the method of
exposure (i.e., formal presentation, group discussions, or
individual research), it is vital that the activity's top
management (CO, XO , key staff members, and department heads)
develop an understanding of IBM, its relationship to the
mission and goals of the activity, and the projected
benefits of such an implementation to them as the upper and
middle management of the command.
The activity's education plan might be used as the
initial step in developing a Plan of Action and Milestones
(POASM) for implementing IRM. A POASM is necessary in order
to structure the implementation process into something that
can be viewed and understood by the entire organization. It
enables an orderly expansion to be planned and periodic
reviews of progress to be established.
The authors -will not attempt to develop a "typical"
POASM, since it is felt that each commanding officer will
have an approach to organizing a project of this scope.
Regardless of the final product though, it is essential that
the PCASM be structured to convey a long range view of the
organization and the identification of actual user needs.
The goal must be the identification of actual needs, in lieu
of perceived needs or nice to have items.
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2« Strategic Reguireme nts Development (Step. 2)
Strategic Requirements Development is an attempt to
establish or define the strategic direction and objectives
of the activity for the future. It is structured to iden-
tify the critical success factors 5 (CSF's) of the activity.
These factors will support the attainment of the activity's
goals. However, the importance of identifying the critical
success factors lies in the fact that the identification
process documents the areas in which good performance is
necessary to ensure attainment of the activity's goals.
[Ref. 6: p. 81]
It is important to point out that critical success
factors are not permanent, particularly in the dynamic envi-
ronment of the Navy. An organization's mission could be
altered cr internal considerations could lead to a set of
temporary critical success factors. The key here is for the
commanding officer to clearly define those factors that are
crucial to the success of the activity in the period being
covered by the planning process. [Ref. 6: p. 87]
The crucial role of the commanding officer during
Strategic Feguirements Development cannot be overemphasized.
The CC must be an active participant in this process, and
must ensure that all key staff members and department heads
take an active role. The CO must develop the view of
Strategic Feguirements Development as an organized and
structured approach by top management to formally evaluate
the mission and purpose of the activity.
The commanding officer must provide the initial
strategic viewpoint of the organization, as well as
providing the strategic implications of various functions
and goals. In addition, the CO must act as a referee,
-The limited number of areas in which results, if thev
are satisfactory, will ensure successful performance for the
organization [Ref. 6: p. 81].
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preventing department heads and" staff members from
attempting to gain a political advantage or attempting to
use the evaluation process as a means to attempt to build an
"empire". When redundancy issues arise or parallelism of
function is evident, the CO must make decisions as to which
functional area is in charge of what data. The commanding
officer's role and participation during this critical
process is the most important critical success factor for
implementing IBM at a shore activity.
The Strategic Requirements Development stage will
give top management a fundamental understanding of the
activity (if done correctly, it may be the first insight for
some participants into the role and duties of other func-
tional managers) and enable top management to identify the
information that is essential for its operation. This
organizational viewpoint and the key informational needs can
then be formulated into objectives for each individual func-
tional area.
The objectives for each functional area should be
derived from an understanding of the activity's goals and
objectives. These functional area objectives must be
supportive of the activity's goals and objectives, and
provide direction for each department head and his partic-
ular functional area. [Ref. 28: p. 170] Only by identifying
activity and functional area objectives can an activity hope
that an information system will take these objectives into
account and identify data relevant to those objectives.
So far the discussion of Strategic Requirements
Development has focused on identifying the activity in its
present structure. However, it must be recognized that
strategic requirements development also emphasizes the
current organization so that a starting point is estab-
lished. Once this framework is constructed, the structure
can be built upon by projecting the requirements of the
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activity for the future. Strategic Requirements Development
emphasizes the current roles, products, and services cf an
activity, hut also attempts to identify these same attri-
butes for the future. [Ref. 28: p. 160]
A detailed examination of the purpose and mission,
and the roles, products and services of an activity is no
easy task. It is a time consuming process that forces top
management to step hack from the present and evaluat€ the
requirements of the activity for the future by recognizing
its functions from the past. Often it is difficult for
people close to an activity to divorce themselves from
today's problems and to look to the future. Regardless, it
must be done. Top management must set aside individual
parochial views and work as a unified and cohesive group.
[Ref. 28: p. 165]
A word of caution is necessary at this point. Many
readers may feel that a self-examination of this depth will
require someone with no vested interest in the outcome of
the review or with experience in systems implementation to
act as a catalyst during the entire process. Such "consult-
ants" are readily available in the civilian marketplace;
but, they are not available as part of the Navy's informa-
tion structure (this was discussed in Chapter VI) .
Regardless, the authors contend that an outside consultant
may not initially be the best alternative for a shore
activity at this stage of the IRM implemention. The
Strategic Requirements Development stage might best be
accomplished by the top management of the activity acting
independently of outside influence.
The authors do not discount the fact that many
consultants provide a valuable and useful service. Likewise,
the authors also do not discount the fact that a consultant
may be useful in one of the later stages of implementation.
Instead, the following points are offered as justification
114

for an activity with limited strategic planning experience,
to implement Strategic Requirements Development as an
in-house project:
1. Strategic planning has been ignored for tco long
(this point was discussed in Chapter V) , and it must
be explored, developed and incorporated into the
management of more shore activities. The use of a
consultant will only perpetuate the lack of awareness
and understanding in this area.
2. The top management of the activity will not gain a
real understanding of the organization or of the
infrastructure for developing an information system
if a consultant is hired. Instead, the consultant
will develop this understanding and will attempt to
convey it to the appropriate personnel in briefings,
or by means of written reports. Regardless of the
vehicle used, the authors contend that the consultant
will be the only person to gain a complete under-
standing of the organization. What happens when the
consultant is no longer under contract?
3. The hiring of a consultant will probably require a
timetable that will be too short for effective imple-
mentation of Strategic Requirements Development.
Contract regulations and budgetary constraints will
prevent an activity from hiring a consultant for the
length of time needed to accomplish this stage prop-
erly. Instead, a compressed timetable might be
suggested by the consultant or other members of the
activity's management team. The end result might be
an implementation process that is compressed to a
point where only marginal success is possible.
4. Implementing Strategic Requirements Development as an
in-house project will not structure the information
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requirements towards a specific information system.
The authors contend that most consultants will
attempt to develop an activity's information needs in
terms of specific hardware and software. By doing
so, the consultant establishes a "position" for
ofctaining additional business as changes are needed
or if problems should develop. Even more critical
though, is the fact that this end product may not be
easily translated or integrated into the Navy's view
that will result from the Bases and Stations
Architecture. In other words, the infrastructure
that is developed for the activity will reflect the
architecture of the tools and not the structures of
the organization— its information flows, its people,
its personality.
5. Perhaps the strongest reason for implementing
Strategic Requirements Development as an in-house
project, is that the activity as a whole gains an
awareness of the methodology involved, and more
importantly, this awareness is retained by the activ-
ity's personnel. A corporate knowledge of "why this
was done" or "why this wasn't done" is developed.
The authors contend that this is a key point to the
future success of the implementation and that the
knowledge gained is vital, particularly in view of
the changing personnel structure of an activity.
3 . Information Beguirements Planning, (Step 3)
Information Feguirements Planning is the stage in
which top management determines what information is needed
to effectively manage the activity. It is based upon the
strategic direction established during Strategic
Requirements Planning and it enables top management to iden-
tify information requirement alternatives and priorities.
[Ref. 28: p. 172]
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Chapter V discussed three levels of management and
the fact that each of these levels requires a different type
of information. Information Requirements Planning is the
stage where top management has an opportunity to discuss and
identify the information needs of these various levels of
management, and the potential benefits of providing that
information. The benefits and costs of all information
requirements are considered, and priorities are established.
Given the resources available, the goal is to identify the
information requirements that will give the activity the
most "bang for the buck". [ Ref . 28: p. 172]
It is vital that an activity recognize that the
information needed by different management levels varies
throughout the organization. Information Requirements
Planning can aid in identifying the information needs of all
three types of management. Subsequently, the information
analysis stage will enable management to define the raw data
essential to provide that information. [Ref. 28: p. 174]
**• Current System Evaluation (Step 4)
The authors assert that many activities will experi-
ence some difficulty in identifying information flows.
Consequently, this step must be inserted here in the imple-
mentation process. Cnly through a thorough understanding cf
the organization's present information flows will the
command be able to forecast the system architecture required
of the future information system.
Current system evaluation is an attempt to determine
how an activity gathers, stores and uses information. It
must be conducted for each functional area, as well as for
the activity. This process involves reviewing and docu-




The purpose cf this process.-is to identify how and
why the activity gathers information. It is an attempt to
document all procedures so that they can be evaluated for
effectiveness, efficiency and redundancy.
This process can begin as soon as an activity
embarks on a goal of implementing IRS. It requires that the
key personnel in each functional area identify all external
and internal reports and how the information for these
reports is obtained and processed.
5 . Appoint an Informat ion Analysis Project Team (S tep
5)
In order to accomplish information analysis it is
necessary that an organized and structured approach be
established to evaluate and categorize all information
needs. A small central group should coordinate the entire
activity and each functional area should appoint a group to
examine its individual needs. The central group has the
responsibility of consolidating the data views from all
functional areas, removing redundancies and resolving any
conflicts that might arise. [Ref. 28: p. 187]
The authors perceive that the XO, ISM, and the
department heads would comprise the central group, and that
each functional area would develop its team based upon its
personnel strengths. The commanding officer is excluded
from this group because it is recognized that the CO will
not be able to participate in most discussions. However,
the authors feel that it is vital that the CO personally
resolve all conflicts that cannot be settled to the mutual
satisfaction of all members of the project team. This
requirement will ensure that political infighting is mini-




6- Information Analysis (Ste£ 6)
Information Analysis is a methodology, which incor-
porates top management's strategic direction, to identify
the data required for effective organizational control
[Ref. 28: p. 64]. It is based upon the premise that to
understand and identify the data relevant to an organization
requires a clear understanding of the organization itself
[Ref. 28: p. 186].
Host organizations are divided into units or func-
tional areas. Information Analysis recognizes this and the
fact that management personnel in each functional area
develop their own specific and unique information needs.
However, the fact remains, top management requires consoli-
dated and summarized data from these functional areas in
order to perform in a decision-making role. Accordingly,
Information Analysis takes a top-down approach in order to
analyze data across the entire organization. It attempts to
identify first the data which is most stable and least
liable to change
—
the fundamental data that will always
apply. In addition, Information Analysis also recognizes
that organizations change and it attempts to identify data
which is the most vulnerable to that change. [Ref. 28: p.
186]
As an activity progresses toward the Information
Analysis stage of IBM implementation, the impact of the
Information Analysis Project Team becomes important. The
authors contend that their role as overall coordinators of
this stage must not be viewed lightly, for without a unified
and structured approach it will be extremely difficult for
the team to obtain an accurate overview of the activity's
data.
Figure 7.2 depicts six different procedures for
Information Analysis. Each of these procedures should be
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viewed as having a specific purpose- " and a specific output.
The authors will describe each procedure in the following
subsections and provide examples applicable to the supply
department discussed in Chapter V.
a. Initial Eata Identification
This procedure reviews the purpose and the
mission of the organization and attempts to identify the
data that is fundamental to the organization now and into
the future. Top management involvement is crucial to
achieve success in this procedure, since their interpreta-
tion of the activity's purpose and mission is vital.
[Ref. 28: p. 187]
The objective of this procedure is an initial
data model and the identification of key data subjects.
[Ref. 28: p. 196] The authors contend that this procedure
should proceed fairly smoothly if the previous steps of the
implementation process have been followed. After all, the
strategic direction has been emphasized as has the critical
information needs of top management. However, any attempt
to jump immediately into this procedure, without having
completed the previous stage, would be extremely difficult.
A return to the supply department may be helpful
in providing an example of the data subjects being
discussed. The authors will assume that the following data






4. Enlisted Dining Facility (EDF)
.
Although all of these data subjects are directly associated
with the supply department, it is important to note that















[Ref. 28: p. 188]
Figure 7.2 Information Analysis Procedures.
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concern of the supply department.— Each of the ether
subjects have applications and/or correlations to other
functional areas within the command.
A word of caution is necessary at this point.
The authors would suggest that it is extremely easy to
become overwhelmed and confuse! by the question cf how much
detail is required in this procedure. The purpose here is
to create an overview— a framework for a more detailed model
to be constructed later in the process [Ref. 28: p. 193].
The authors contend that any attempt at too specific a level
of detail, will be counter productive and should be avoided.
In addition, the subsequent procedures in information anal-
ysis will most likely identify any oversights.
b. Functional Area Review
This procedure requires that each functional
area review the subject list developed in Initial Data
Identification, concentrating on those subjects relevant to
its specific area. [Hef. 28: p. 213] This procedure expands
the data identified in Procedure (1), by incorporating addi-
tional data identified from a functional area perspective.
In most cases, this functional area perspective will also
identify various attributes 6 for each data subject. Each
attribute must be defined and clearly documented as to its
corresponding data subject.
The supply functior will again be utilized to
provide an example of this procedure. Table IV indicates
the attributes the data subject "priority requisitions"
might possess.
6 Attribute— characteristics of the data subject which we




An Example of Attributes
Data Subject Attribute








c. Functional Area Objectives Data Extension
This procedure recognizes that no two similar
activities will ever strive for exactly the same objectives;
tut depending on the organization's environment and the
make-up cf top management, will define unique and specific
objectives. These objectives are projected downward tc each
functional area, which in turn develops its own objectives.
[Ref. 28: p. 190]
This step is an attempt to review the activity's
objectives and to verify that these objectives are projected
down through the organization, resulting in supportive func-
tional area objectives. After this is accomplished, the
data necessary to measure objective achievement is deter-
mined. Reviewing the objectives in this manner identifies
the data upon which decisions are based and expands the data
model developed in the previous procedures. [Ref. 28: p.
191 ]
In order to use the supply function in further
examples, it is necessary to make a number of assumptions.
The authors will assuire that an objective of the activity is
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to maintain a high "quality of- -life" posture for all
personnel, both permanent and TAD, assigned to the command.
This activity objective is translated in the supply function
to an objective of operating an EDF that provides appetizing
and nutritious meals, within the established cost
constraints.
The authors feel that in order to measure the
achievement of this objective, a number of factors must be
considered. The records and returns maintained by the Food
Service Officer will identify the financial status cf the
EDF. Specifically, the KAVSUF Form 333 indicates the finan-
cial status on a daily basis. However, the determination of
quality and appeal is much harder to quantify or measure. A
meal evaluation report by a designated individual or by any
patron of the EDF will provide some indication of the in di-
vidual^s views on the meal evaluated. However, it shouli be
obvious to the reader, that it is extremely difficult to
quantify this aspect of the functional objective.
The authors chose this particular example, in
order to demonstrate that many objectives involve intangible
aspects that are difficult to quantify and/or to identify
specific data upon which to measure achievement.
Regardless, every attempt should be made to ensure that
specific data is made available to measure achievement of
intangible objectives.
d. ' Current Data Examination
i
Current Data Examination reviews the data that
is presently used by the activity. This involves reviewing
all reports> source documents, ledgers, etc., and identi-
fying all data subjects and attributes. [ Ref . 28: p. 191]
It should be pointed out that the previous steps
identified both current data and future data. However, the
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future data may or may not exist at the present tine. This
procedure is an attempt to cross-check current data in order
that the activity can move to the future. This step will
produce a data model that can then be compared with the data
model developed earlier in Procedures (1) through (3).
An example of the results of Current Data
Examination could be provided by reviewing the procurement
branch's supply log for standard stock material (a separate
log is kept for each type of procurement) . This log book is
used to record information on all standard stock requisi-
tions submitted to the supply department. Table V identi-







e. Functional Area Integration
This procedure combines the functional area data
models and subject lists developed in Procedures (1) through
(3) and incorporates the essential data from Procedure ( U) .
[Ref. 28: p. 191]
Many redundancies will exist between the data
identified in the various functional areas. For example,
data subjects may be referred to by different names in
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different functional areas or even —in the same functional
area. The reader must keep in mind that the objective cf
information analysis is to achieve a coordinated overview of
the data subjects throughout the activity. [ Eef . 23: p.
191] Keeping this in mind, the authors view this step as
extremely important and one that should be carefully struc-
tured. It is likely that data will be identified that may
not presently exist in the current data structures of any
functional area. In addition, data may have been identified
that is not really required— data that someone thought was
needed. In either case, action should be initiated to
resolve the status of these data subjects and any ether
questionable data subjects.
f. Data Conflict Resolution
Data Conflict Resolution is an attempt to
resolve conflicts and controversy over the definition and
accountability status of data shared across functional
areas. It is a means of determining what functional area is
responsible for creating and deleting data that is shared.
In addition, this procedure requires that all users of
shared data be identified. The resolution of ail data
"conflicts" is the objective cf this procedure. [Ref. 28:
p. 192]
g. Summary
The six procedures for information analysis have
developed a list cf data that is fundamental to the
activity. This data is necessary for day-to-day operations,
to be utilized for the measurement of objective attainment,
and is crucial to the decision-making process [Ref. 28: p.
204].
Once again, the authors point out that a
specific discussion cr mention cf computers has not been
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made. The purpose of the preceding data analysis has been
to provide a methodology that would enable the activity to
identify why and how it will use computers to "lighten the
load". The authors contend that only now, after building
the activity data model and information flows, can these
questions be addressed. The authors perceive that an
activity that has progressed to this plateau is now ready to
incorporate computer technology to automate the activity's









What is it going to do for the activity, for
individual managers?
Define your philosophy, your goals and what the
project will do.
What policies aDd procedures will be used to impart
your philosophy throughout the activity?
IMPFJAJIZE THE LONG TERH PERSPECTIVE
IRM will not be implemented overnight, but rather,
over a timeframe defined in months.
IRM must be viewed as an evolutionary process that
will depend on the current organization and its mode
cf operation.
Your view towards IRK will change through time.
The present organization must be viewed in terms of
the future.
DEVELOP AN EDUCATION PROGRAM
Hew do we educate the personnel of the command?




Command Support Development (cont'd)
DE7E1 CP A POASM
How detailed should this plan be?
How lcr.g a period sh ould the plan cover?
Will the plan bring about control , whic h will
en a ble further time to plan?
Is the plan simple enough to succee d but sp ecif ic
eno ugh to structure the actions of the activity.
Dc department heads feel that the POASM is real-
ist ic?
APPOINT AN INFORMATION SYSTEM MANAGER
Is there a qualified person presently assig ned
to the activity?
Is it possible tc hire a qualified person?
If a present staff member must b e assign ed
,
can the person be expected to interact will
all departments impartially
.
How much time will the staff member be able to






What is the activities mission?
Who do we report to, who reports to us?
What activities do we support, what activities
support us?
Do we anticipate any changes in the the present
structure?
STATE ACTIVITY OBJECTIVES
What are the objectives of the activity?
What is the priority of each objective?
Why are the priorities assigned the way they are?
Are the objectives in line with our mission and
vice versa?
30W IS THE ACTIVITY ORGANIZED
What is the activity's organizational structure
—
both formal and informal?
Is the structure efficient as well as effective?





Strategic Requirements Development (cont 'd)
KQ1 IS SUCCESS DEFINED FOR THE COMMAND?
Has "success" been defined?
Is "success" viewed in terms of the CO's fitness
reports, competitive functional area awards,
fleet reputation, or the accomplishment of top
manage- ment's goals?
IHAT ARE THE CRITICAL SUCCESS FACTORS fCSF'S) ?
CSF's can be dynamic; should the activity's be
updated?
Are the CSF's the or only indicators of organ-
izational performance?
How have they been determined?
Do they coincide with areas that are presently
dominating top management's time?
Are the CSF's measurable or quantifable? If
not, how will they be measured?
Are department heads aware of the CSF's that




Strategic Requirements Development (cont'd)
HQW IS THE ACTIVITY EVALUATED?
By whom, hov, present status?
Hew often is the is the evaluation done?
What areas have been identified as needing
improvement?
Are evaluation results meaningful in identifying
required information flows?
WHAT EVALUATED AREAS NEED SPECIAL ATTENTION?
Is it a true need or a nice to have item?
Are we spending 807 of . our effort on 20% of
the critical areas?
WHAT INFORMATION IS CRUCIAL?
what does the CC need?
What does the executive officer need?
what is needed by the department heads?
Is the information presently available?
How is the information supplied or
obtained?





Strategic Requirements Development (cont'd)
DEFINE OBSTRUCTIONS
What obstructions, both tangible and intangible,
impede the achievement of the activity's goals
and objectives?
How can these obstructions be overcome?
Is there a better way of doing business?
Could some objectives be redefined?
DJIINJ THE FUNCTIONAL AREAS
What are the functional areas?
Which functional areas are key to our way of
doing business?
What are their objectives?
Do their objectives support the organizations
goals and objectives?







Are the objectives prioritized?
Are the objectives understood and supported ty all
department heads?
Are the objectives quantifable or are they sub-
jective and open to interpretation?
UIII1I THE THREE LEVELS OF MANAGEMENT.
Top—CO, XO , Department Heads
Flanning--CO, XC, Department Heads, Division Officers
Operating— Division Officers, CPO's, LPO's
PISCRIB1 THE INFORMATION NEEDS OF EACH LEVEL
Ql MANAGEMENT.
Top— information needs for both today as well as the
the future. Needs information that is effective and
will assist in the decision making process.
Planning— information for evaluating the activity in
the future. Trends, comparisons, and projections
are of interest.





Information Eequirements Planning (cont'd)
CAN TEE INFORMATICS FLOWS BE IDENTIFIED FOR EACH
lEVEl OF HANAGEHENT?
Have these inforiration flows been diagramed?
Has all data for the information flows within a
functional area been identified as either inde-
pendent, interdependent, or intradependent?
EI1I11 THE INFORaAIION ROUTINELY PROVIDED TO
TEE COMMANDING OFFICER.
Compare the information presently provided by
each functional area with the information
required by the .CO (as identified in Strategic
Requirements Development)
Review and analyze any discrepancies.
Is the information provided to the CO in a
usable format?
Is the information provided solely as a 30
need, or is the data required for other
external/internal reports?
If the information is required for other
reports, is the format altered prior to




Information Bequirements Planning (cont'd)
RE7IE1 THE INFORMATION OCCASIONALLY REQUIRED
THE CO.
flhat information is required and who provides
this information?
How often is this information required?
Is the information readily available, or does it
require analysis and/or computations?
Could the information be included in a routine
report to the CC? Is it cost effective to do so?
PJFINE THE IHFOEBATION REQUIRED 3Y THE EXECUTIVE
OFFICER.
Apply the same type questions as for the CO.
DEFINE THE INFORMATION REQUIRED BY EACH
DEPARTMENT HEAD
What information is routinely provided to the
department head (i.e., daily or weekly)? How
is this information used?
Is this information accumulated by the depart-
ment head for daily, weekly, monthly or quar-
terly reports?
Is ag9regate information also provided by





Information Requirements Planning (cont'd)




IDENTIFY ALL INFOEBATION PRESENTLY PROVIDED BY
AUTOWATED SYSTEMS
Are the top priorities automated?
Has any form cf cost benefit analysis been
dene on this automated system?
Is the system effective or does it merely
provide a nice looking format or copy?
IDENTIFY INFORMATION CONSIDERED TO HAVE III
MOST
APPLICATION TO AN AUTOMATED SYSTEM.





IS TOP MANAGEMENT INVOLVED AND COMMITTED TO
INFORMATION ANAIISIS?
Do the department heads understand the commitment
and why?
Has the CO provided his interpretation of the
activities direction?
Has the command teen briefed as to the present status
of IBM implementation, and the critical nature of
the user*s involvement to the Informantion Analysis
step?
HAVI THE QUESTIONS FROM THE PREVIOUS STEPS BEEN .
REVIEWED AND THE ANSWERS./EESOLTS BEEN VERIFIED?
HAS A POASM BEEN DEVELOPED FOR THE INFORMATION
MA IISIS PROJECT TEAM?
Is the P0A5M realistic?
Does it mesh with the overall implementation POASM?
Are each of the six procedures covered by the POA&M?




Information Analysis (cont 1 d)
HAVE THE KEY DATA SUBJECTS FOB THE ACTIVITY
BEEN IDENTIFIED?
Does top management agree with these data
subjects?
HAVE INDIVIDUAL FUNCTIONAL. AREA. PROJECT TEAMS
BEEN APPOINTED?
Have these groups been briefed by the activi-
ty's project team?
Have project leaders been appointed?
Have functional area POACH 1 s been developed?
HCW IS INFORMATION PROVIDED TO THE FUNCTIONAL
AREA PROJECT GROUPS?
ARE TEE FUNCTIONAL AREA PROJECT GROUPS "USER"
GROUPS?
Are members of the activity's project team





HAVE DATA SUBJECTS THAT HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS
HO LONGER BEENING NEEDED BEEN CAREFULLY
SCREENED?
Who will approve the fact that this data is no
longer required?
HAVE "STATUS QUO" CR "BUSINESS AS USUAL" TYPE
DATA SUBJECTS BEEN CAREFULLY REVIEWED?
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